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Local Government Law
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
This particular [City Commission] meeting had drawn on for quite
some time, until it was getting fairly late. We heard someone knocking
very rapidly on the plate glass window. As I turned around, I observed
an elderly woman, the wife of the Mayor. The Mayor appeared to
ignore his wife and continued to conduct the meeting. Not getting any
response from her knocking, the wife then walked into the building,
grabbed the Mayor by the arm, and scolded him that it was ridiculous
that the City Commission was meeting so late at night. "You," she
informed the Mayor, "are going home." With that, the wife intensified
her hold on the Mayor's shirt sleeve, dragged him out of the building,
and took him home. This obviously broke up the City Commission
meeting, and we all left for the night.'
Oh, for more sine die adjournments in the nocturnal administration of
local government!
I.

MUNICIPALITIES

Officers and Employees

A.

The period's litigation concerning municipal officers and employees
reflected intriguing variety on two fronts: the range of benefits claimed

* Carter Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Georgia School of Law. University
of Georgia (A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard Law School (LL.M., 1961). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
1.

R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: LITE 42-43 (1997). For a more

substantive "profile" of local government law-those who practice it and the practice
itself-see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., A PROFILE: THE PEOPLE AND THE PRACTICE OF GEORGIA
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1996). See also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Lawyers Who Represent
Local Governments, 23 GA. ST. B.J. 58 (1986); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local
Government Law: A Reflection on Thirty Surveys, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1994); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Local Government Litigation: Some Pivotal Principles, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1
(2003); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Appellate Conflicts in Local Government Law: The Disagreements of a Decade, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1 (2004).
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by the plaintiffs and the legal theories under which they proceeded.
Mandamus 2 and estoppel3 served as the theories of choice in Dukes v.
Board of Trustees,4 a retired police officer's challenge to his pension
reduction.5 Tracing the pension board's actions in originally approving-then reducing-the plaintiff's retirement amount,6 a narrowly
divided court held estoppel ineffectual: because the plaintiff failed to
satisfy a pension act requirement for crediting prior service,7 "his
entitlement ... never vested."8
The court distinguished a prior
decision 9 by reasoning that "[w]hen the pension decision goes to
entitlement, as opposed to calculation of benefits, the
... estoppel doctrine does not apply." ° Accordingly, the plaintiff's
petition to mandamus reinstatement of his prior retirement amount
suffered adamant rejection."
Absence of a "vested right" also imperiled the retired employees' claim
to a cost-free Preferred Provider Organization ("PPO") form of health

2. On the problems encountered with the remedy of mandamus in local government
law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS iN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW (1989).
3. For background on the action, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE DOCTRINE OF
ESTOPPEL IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1985).
4. 280 Ga. 550, 629 S.E.2d 240 (2006).
5. See id. at 550-51, 629 S.E.2d at 240.
6. Id. One year after approving the plaintiffs receiving credit for prior service with
the county, the board rescinded its decision and reduced the plaintiffs retirement benefits.
Id.
7. Id. at 551, 629 S.E.2d at 241. The plaintiff had not filed his application for prior
credit with the board five years prior to his retirement, id. at 551 n.1, 629 S.E.2d at 241
n. 1, as required by the 1978 Atlanta Pension Act. ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6222(k)(1) (2007).
8. Dukes, 280 Ga. at 553, 629 S.E.2d at 242. The court relied upon section 45-6-5 of
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A."): "The public may not be estopped by
the acts of any officer done in the exercise of an unconferred power.'" 280 Ga. at 552, 629
S.E.2d at 242 (emphasis omitted) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 45-6-5 (2002)).
9. Quillian v. Employees' Ret. Sys. of Ga., 259 Ga. 253, 379 S.E.2d 515 (1989). "In so
ruling, the Court made a distinction 'between an irregular exercise of a granted power, and
the total absence or want of power. . . .'" Dukes, 280 Ga. at 552, 629 S.E.2d at 242 (quoting
Quillian, 259 Ga. at 254, 379 S.E.2d at 517).
10. Dukes, 280 Ga. at 553, 629 S.E.2d at 242. "Here [the plaintiffs] entitlement to the
prior service credit never vested; thus, the board lacked any 'power which is expressly
conferred by law' to award a pension based on that prior service. Accordingly, [the
plaintiff] may not avail himself of the doctrine of estoppel ..
" Id. at 554, 629 S.E.2d at
242-43.
11. See id. at 554, 629 S.E.2d at 243. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant
of summary judgment to the defendant pension board. Id. Three justices dissented on the
ground that "the Board's recognition of [the plaintiffs] prior service was not an 'ultra vires'
act." Id. at 556, 629 S.E.2d at 244 (Sears, C.J., dissenting).
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insurance in Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County v. McCrary."
Observing that the plaintiffs had paid for their PPO coverage while
employed, 3 the supreme court could find no "impairment of contract"
by the local government in offering only HMO cost-free insurance upon
retirement. 4 "Requiring [the plaintiffs] to elect the HMO option if they
wish to receive cost-free coverage does not violate the impairment clause
of the Georgia Constitution, since they never had a vested right to
maintain in retirement the precise health-care delivery system by which
they received their coverage while employed.""
A salary difference claim comprised the employee's complaint in
Williams v. City of Atlanta, 6 consisting of actions against the municipality for both mandamus and quantum meruit." As for the former,
the supreme court discounted the plaintiff's reliance upon a prior
grievance decision by the city's Bureau of Labor Relations which simply
declared no bureau objections to city rectification of the problem.' 8
That "decision," the court emphasized, established no "clear legal right"
necessary for a mandamus. 9 Yet another decision-this one by the
trial court-doomed the plaintiff's claim for quantum meruit: "[Tihe
trial court's finding that [the plaintiff] had a contract with the city ...
precludes [the plaintiff's] action for quantum meruit.""

12. 280 Ga. 901, 901-04, 635 S.E.2d 150, 151-53 (2006).
13. Id. at 901, 635 S.E.2d at 151. "While employed, [the plaintiffs] selected the PPO
option and paid the premiums. After they retired, however, they sought to retain their
PPO coverage without paying any premiums." Id.
14. Id. at 904, 635 S.E.2d at 153. The plaintiffs contended that requiring them to pay
for PPO coverage after retirement impaired their previously vested rights and, thus,
violated the constitution's mandate that "'[n]o . ..laws impairing the obligation of contract
... shall be passed.'" Id. at 901, 635 S.E.2d at 151 (second and third alterations in
original) (quoting GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 10).
15. Id. at 904, 635 S.E.2d at 153. Reversing the trial court's order of lifetime no-cost
PPO coverage, the court reasoned as follows: "A more limited right to choose where and
how to access medical services is not the equivalent of a reduction in the level of coverage
provided for medical expenses." Id.
16. 281 Ga. 478, 640 S.E.2d 35 (2007).
17. Id. at 478-79, 640 S.E.2d at 36. The plaintiff alleged that the city had refused to
pay him agreed-upon wages and to give him credit for former service as it had promised
when he returned to work. Id. at 479, 640 S.E.2d at 36.
18. Id. at 480, 640 S.E.2d at 37. "[T]he grievance decision stated that the bureau had
no 'objection to any accommodation' the sewer department would make to rectify [the
plaintiffs] situation." Id.
19. Id. "Thus, [the plaintiff] did not have a clear legal right to the relief he sought, and
the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the city on [the plaintiffs]
mandamus claim." Id.
20. Id. For yet another survey period failure of quantum meruit, see Brown v. Penland
Construction Co., 281 Ga. 625, 641 S.E.2d 522 (2007). There, the supreme court focused
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Finally, Merry v. Williams 21 presented an intriguing issue of local
government legislative process2-specifically, how abstentions by the
consolidated government commissioners were to be counted in determining vote results.23 Initially, the court looked to the government's
charter requirement that at least six members vote in the affirmative for
commission action. 24 That mandate "'clearly prohibits counting an
abstention or refusal to vote as affirmative action.'" 2' Additionally, in
formulating its rules of procedure, the commission had "rejected a rule
requiring that abstentions be counted as negative votes."2 6 Accordingly,
the court concluded, "[Aibstentions by commissioners must not be
counted as either affirmative or negative votes."27

upon a high school baseball coach involved in discussions for constructing an indoor hitting
facility. Id. at 625, 641 S.E.2d at 523. Reversing the court of appeals decision that the
coach might be liable in quantum meruit to the construction company, id. at 627, 641
S.E.2d at 524, the court took refuge in immunity: "[The company's] action for quantum
meruit against [the coach] individually would be barred by official immunity," id. at 626,
641 S.E.2d at 523.
Finally, State v. West, 283 Ga. App. 302, 641 S.E.2d 289 (2007), concerned instances in
which public officials charged with certain offenses are entitled to the protections of
receiving a copy of the indictment and appearing before the grand jury. See id. at 302, 641
S.E.2d at 289. Here, the court of appeals held those protections applicable only when
charges are made under the statute, O.C.G.A. section 45-11-4(b) (2007), expressly granting
the protections, West, 283 Ga. App. at 304, 641 S.E.2d at 290. Because, in the case at bar,
the mayor was charged with other offenses (but could have been charged under the above
statute), the court held him devoid of the protections provided. Id. Otherwise, said the
court, "[it] would render meaningless [statutory] language specifying that '[tihis Code
section shall not apply when a public offic[ial] is charged with any other crime alleged to
have occurred while such official was in the performance of an official duty.'" Id. (quoting
O.C.G.A. § 45-11-4(d)) (third brackets in original) (emphasis omitted). For treatment of the
grand jury protection, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal Government Officials and the
Grand Jury, 26 GA. ST. B.J. 50 (1989).
21. 281 Ga. 571, 642 S.E.2d 46 (2007).
22. See generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Legislative Process in Georgia Local
Government Law, 5 GA. L. REV. 1 (1970).
23. Merry, 281 Ga. at 572, 642 S.E.2d at 48. The case arose from a controversy over
electing a mayor pro tem, a controversy rendered moot by subsequent developments. Id.
at 571-72, 642 S.E.2d at 47-48. Yet, the court maintained, "[Allthough the particular
dispute regarding the 2006 election is over, we cannot conclude that the more general issue
of the appropriate method for counting abstentions is moot." Id. at 573, 642 S.E.2d at 48.
24. Id. at 573, 642 S.E.2d at 48. "The departure from the common law [rule of a simple
majority of a quorum] is even more clear where, as here, the charter requires the
affirmative vote of a specific minimum number of commissioners." Id.
25. Id. at 575, 642 S.E.2d at 50 (quoting City of Haven v. Gregg, 766 P.2d 143, 147
(Kan. 1988)).
26. Id. at 576, 642 S.E.2d at 50.
27. Id.

20071
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Elections

Two city council candidates challenged election results during the
survey period, receiving contrasting dispositions by the supreme
court. 28 Brodie v. Champion29 featured an unsuccessful (by five votes)
candidate's constitutional attack upon a state statute 0 prohibiting the
counting of write-in ballots for ineligible candidates.3 1 Affording the
complaint fairly short shrift, the court noted the constitution's delegation
of legislative power to provide for the eligibility of write-in candidates.32
"The legislature properly exercised [that] power," the court asserted,
"when it limited the counting of write-in votes to votes cast for qualified
write-in candidates. 33
The unsuccessful (by one vote) candidate in Allen v. Yost 34 alleged
votes by ineligible voters, only to suffer the trial judge's dismissal for
failing to challenge those votes prior to the election.33 Conceding the
statutory provision for a pre-election challenge of voter qualifications, 6
the supreme court denied that statute to constitute "the only procedure
available to a candidate who wishes to challenge the results of an
election." 37 Other statutes, the court delineated, plainly "permit[] a postelection challenge" in the manner sought by the plaintiff." Accordingly, "[TIhere is simply no statutory provision or case law to support the
proposition that a candidate must challenge the illegal votes prior to the

28. See Brodie v. Champion, 281 Ga. 105,636 S.E.2d 511 (2006); Allen v. Yost, 281 Ga.
102, 636 S.E.2d 517 (2006).
29. 281 Ga. 105, 636 S.E.2d 511 (2006).
30. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-494 (2003).
31. Brodie, 281 Ga. at 105, 636 S.E.2d at 511-12. The plaintiff contended that had the
nine uncounted write-in votes been tabulated, a run-off election would have been required.
Id. at 105 n.1, 636 S.E.2d at 512 n.1.
32. Id. at 106, 636 S.E.2d at 512 (citing GA. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. 3).
33. Id. at 107, 636 S.E.2d at 513. "Because unqualified write-in candidates cannot
assume office, counting the write-in votes for these unqualified candidates would be a futile
act by the Board. The legislature is not required to impose such a meaningless function on
the election superintendent." Id.
at 106, 636 S.E.2d at 512.
34. 281 Ga. 102, 636 S.E.2d 517 (2006).
35. Id. at 103, 636 S.E.2d at 518. The plaintiff alleged the casting of at least four
illegal votes and had previously requested and received a vote recount, but the results
remained the same. Id.
36. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-230 (2003 & Supp. 2006).
37. Allen, 281 Ga. at 103-04, 636 S.E.2d at 518 (emphasis omitted).
38. Id. at 104, 636 S.E.2d at 518. The court emphasized that the plaintiff brought her
action under O.C.G.A. sections 21-2-521 and 21-2-522. Allen, 281 Ga. at 104, 636 S.E.2d
at 518; O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-521 to -522 (2003).
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election or else be foreclosed from bringing an election contest."39
Indeed, the court wryly concluded, "Election results can only be obtained
after the election is held.""
C.

Powers

A municipality's construction of a land application system ("LAS")
brought City of Cairo v. Hightower Consulting Engineers, Inc.41 before
the Georgia Court of Appeals.
The city claimed the defendant's
negligent misrepresentation in plans submitted for the system and
economic loss from the system's 1998 malfunction. 42 Responding to this
2001 lawsuit, the defendant argued the four-year statute of limitation's
commencement in 1994 when the city received the defendant's report on
the land's suitability for the system. 43
Rejecting the defendant's
position, the court viewed "[tihe evidence [to] show that not until after
it activated its LAS, in March 1998, did the City incur pecuniary losses
due to misrepresentations in [the defendant's] report."4 4 Thus, "The
City suffered pecuniary losses with certainty at the earliest in March
1998, when its LAS was activated and immediately malfunctioned."4 5
Having filed its suit "well within four years of that time," the court
concluded, "the [city's] negligent misrepresentation claim was not time46
barred.,
D. Regulation
"Regulation" litigation populated the period under scrutiny with a
standoff between governmental regulatory efforts and constitutional

39. Allen, 281 Ga. at 104, 636 S.E.2d at 519.
40. Id. Thus, the court reversed the trial judge's dismissal of the plaintiffs challenge.
Id.
41. 278 Ga. App. 721, 629 S.E.2d 518 (2006). The court described the LAS as "an
irrigation system for disposal of the City's wastewater." Id. at 721, 629 S.E.2d at 520. Its
success depended upon the location of "suitable land that would allow the wastewater to
permeate the soil without significant runoff." Id. at 721-22, 629 S.E.2d at 520.
42. Id. at 723-24, 629 S.E.2d at 521-22. The system malfunctioned immediately upon
activation, sending streams of runoff in all directions with significant erosion and causing
the city to be cited by the Georgia Environmental Protection Division. Id.
43. Id. at 726-27, 629 S.E.2d at 523. The court designated the applicable period of
limitations as that provided by O.C.G.A. section 9-3-30(a): "'within four years after the
right of action accrues."' City of Cairo, 278 Ga. App. at 727, 629 S.E.2d at 524 (quoting
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30(a) (1982 & Supp. 2006)).
44. 278 Ga. App. at 728, 629 S.E.2d at 524.
45. Id.
46. Id. Additionally, the court held the city's claim to fall within the "misrepresentation exception" to the economic loss rule and affirmed the trial judge's award of damages
to the city. Id. at 729, 629 S.E.2d at 525.

2007]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

freedoms.47 In the main, the freedoms prevailed. In Fulton County v.
City of Atlanta,5 the county challenged the city's solid waste disposal
efforts49 by brandishing a state statute prohibiting the transportation
of waste to landfills across county lines unless authorized by the
originating and receiving counties.5 ° Receptive to the city's defensive
attack, the Georgia Supreme Court relied squarely upon an admonition
by the United States Supreme Court: 1 "'[Olur prior cases teach that
a State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures
of the Commerce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of
commerce through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the
State itself."'52 The statute "gives Georgia counties the power to veto
the importation
of solid waste," the court reasoned, and "[t]his it cannot
53

do."

Commerce Clause protection likewise surmounted municipal taxicab
regulation. Atlanta Taxicab Co. Owners Ass'n v. City of Atlanta 4
featured an ordinance requiring a Certificate of Public Necessity and
Convenience ("CPNC") for taxi operators and owners and that the holder
be a Georgia resident for at least one year.5
In appraising the
challengers' Commerce Clause attack, a majority of the supreme court
carefully delineated between taxicab operators and owners.56 As for the
former, "a residency requirement may be justified on the grounds that

47. For treatment of municipal regulatory power in an assortment of contexts, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., "Ascertainable Standards" versus "Unbridled Discretion" in Local
Government Regulation, 41 GA. COUNTY GOV'T MAG. 19 (Dec. 1989); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Discretion in Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV. 614 (1974); R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Local Government Law and Liquor Licensing:A Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L. REV. 1039
(1981); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Reasoning by Riddle: The Power to Prohibitin GeorgiaLocal
Government Law, 9 GA. L. REV. 115 (1974).
48. 280 Ga. 353, 629 S.E.2d 196 (2006).
49. Id. at 353, 629 S.E.2d at 196-97. The municipality had contracted with a private
disposal service for solid waste transportation to landfills in neighboring counties. Id.
50. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-1-16(a) (2006)).
51. Id. at 353-54, 629 S.E.2d at 197; Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't
of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
52. Fulton County, 280 Ga. at 353-54, 629 S.E.2d at 197 (brackets in original) (quoting
Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 361).
53. Id. at 354, 629 S.E.2d at 197. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's decision of
unconstitutionality. See id.
54. 281 Ga. 342, 638 S.E.2d 307 (2006).
55. Id. at 342,638 S.E.2d at 310 (citing ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 162-57,
-62 (2007)).
56. Id. at 344, 638 S.E.2d at 311-12. "However, the City, through its ordinances, does
not limit its regulation of the taxi business to those who actually provide the local services.
It also exercises control over who can own and operate a local taxi business." Id., 638
S.E.2d at 311.

292

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

it enhances public safety and fosters more efficient service."57 Regarding those engaged in the taxi business, however, the city advanced no
"legitimate local purpose served by the residency requirement,"5 8 thus
rendering the measure one of "'economic protectionism which creates an
59
artificial barrier to commerce and violates the Commerce Clause.'
Shifting from commerce to expression, State v. Fielden ° focused upon
a state statute proscribing the knowing or reckless commission of "'any
act which may reasonably be expected to prevent or disrupt a lawful
meeting, gathering, or procession.'" 1
The challengers were two
defendants who had stood silently as a show of support for another
citizen refusing to yield the podium at a municipal council meeting. 2
In review, a majority of the supreme court distinguished between the
defects of vagueness and overbreadth.6 3 As for the former, the statute
provided "a sufficiently definite warning to a person of ordinary
intelligence of the prohibited conduct" and appeared "clear and
unambiguous."6 4
Conversely, the measure failed a valid balance
between the fundamental right of assemblage and that of free speech,
thus violating the First Amendment proscription of overbroadness."5
Under the statute's reach, the court cautioned,
Any- recklessly or knowingly committed act that could reasonably be
expected to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting, gathering or procession is a misdemeanor, regardless where it is committed, how trivial

57. Id. at 346, 638 S.E.2d at 313.
58. Id. at 347, 638 S.E.2d at 313.
59. Id. (quoting Wometco Servs., Inc. v. Gaddy, 616 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Ark. 1981)). The
court thus reversed the trial judge's refusal "to find that the one-year Georgia residency
requirement violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution." Id. Three
justices dissented in part from the decision. Id. at 352, 638 S.E.2d at 317 (Benham, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The court also rejected the plaintiffs due
process contention that suspension or revocation of the owner's CPNC for his drivers'
failure to obtain valid insurance or obtain a driving permit imposed unlawful vicarious
liability. Id. at 347-49, 638 S.E.2d at 313-14 (majority opinion). The court distinguished
vicarious criminal liability from vicarious civil sanctions and found no violations of the
owner's due process. Id.
60. 280 Ga. 444, 629 S.E.2d 252 (2006).
61. Id. at 444, 629 S.E.2d at 254 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-11-34(a) (2003)).
62. Id. The defendants had been arrested and charged with the statute's violation. Id.
63. Id. at 444-45, 629 S.E.2d at 254.
64. Id. The court thus disagreed with the trial judge's decision of vagueness. Id. at
445, 629 S.E.2d at 254.
65. Id. at 445-46, 629 S.E.2d at 254-55. "A statute that is clear about what it prohibits
can nevertheless be unconstitutionally overbroad if it stifles expression or conduct that is
otherwise protected by the Constitution." Id. at 445, 629 S.E.2d at 254.

2007]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

293

the act, its impact, or66the intent of the actor other than the intent to
commit the act itself.
E.

Contracts

Generally, a municipality's contracting capabilities are governed by
intermeshing state and city legislative strictures ,
as instructively
indicated by Griffin Bros. v. Town of Alto.6" There, an unsuccessful
bidder on a pipeline project, suing the city for damages and injunctive
relief, argued its submission of the lowest bid for the project. 69 In
response, the court of appeals noted an exception ° in the state statute
requiring contract awards to the lowest bidder: 71 "[Tihese requirements
do not apply to projects [such as the present] that can be performed for
less than $100,000. ",72 Alternatively, the plaintiff urged that the
mayor's preliminary actions in ordering project materials estopped the
town from denying a valid purchase contract.7 3 Rejecting this position

66. Id. at 447, 629 S.E.2d at 256. Thus, the court affirmed the trial judge's decision of
unconstitutional overbroadness. Id. at 448, 629 S.E.2d at 257. A dissenting opinion for
two justices urged error in the court's broad connotation of overbroadness: "Disturbances
of lawful assemblages, with the requisite statutory intent, that are not constitutionally
protected are those which either cause the termination of the assemblage in an untimely
manner or substantially impair the conduct of the lawful meeting." Id. at 451, 629 S.E.2d
at 258-59 (Carley, J., dissenting).
Yet another case of the period, Simmons v. State, 281 Ga. App. 252, 635 S.E.2d 849
(2006), queried only whether a state regulatory measure applied in the municipal
context-defendant's "sole enumeration of error [contended] that golf carts driven on a
municipal trail system are outside the DUI provisions of [O.C.G.A. section] 40-6-391(a)."
281 Ga. at 252, 635 S.E.2d at 849 (citing O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a) (2004)). Affording the
issue the briefest of shrift, the court of appeals emphasized that "the DUI statute by its
plain language applies to 'any moving vehicle,"' id., 635 S.E.2d at 850 (quoting O.C.G.A.
§ 49-6-391(a)) and "anywhere in Georgia, whether on a street, highway, or private
property," id. at 254, 635 S.E.2d at 850-51. Thus, no hole-in-one for the defendant.
67. See generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Legislative Process in Georgia Local
Government Law, 5 GA. L. REV. 1 (1970); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Governments and
Contracts that Bind, 3 GA. L. REV. 546 (1969); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government
Litigation:Some Pivotal Principles, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1 (2003).

68. 280 Ga. App. 176, 633 S.E.2d 589 (2006).
69. Id. at 177, 633 S.E.2d at 590. Actually, the court explained, although the winning
bid was higher, that bid included a more extensive scope of work which better met the
town's needs. Id. at 177-78, 633 S.E.2d at 590.
70. Id. at 177, 633 S.E.2d at 590 (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-91-22(a) (2006)).
71. O.C.G.A. § 36-91-21 (2006).
72. Griffin Bros., 280 Ga. App. at 177,633 S.E.2d at 590 (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-91-22(a)).
Here the winning bid was in the amount of $89,989. Id.
73. Id. at 178, 633 S.E.2d at 590. Prior to the bidding procedure, the mayor had
telephoned the plaintiff and, due to rising costs of materials, had requested the plaintiff
to order the necessary pipe for the project. Id. at 177, 633 S.E.2d at 590.
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as well, the court relied upon a town resolution limiting to $2000 the
mayor's unilateral authority to obligate the town.74 Because any
contract asserted by the plaintiff was thus unauthorized, he was
foreclosed from invoking the argument of municipal estoppel.7"
F

Roads

The survey period unfolded a rather unique facet of municipal law-a
proceeding under the sidewalk abandonment statute 7s-in A A OK, Ltd.
v. City of Atlanta.77 When the plaintiff sought to register title to the
allegedly abandoned roadway," the trial court appointed an examiner
who conducted a hearing and issued a report denying that any abandonment had occurred. Upon the court's adoption of the report, the plaintiff
objected that no transcript had been submitted by the examiner and,
thus, the court's approval constituted error.79 Reviewing the issue, the
supreme court determined that the statute's prescribed procedures 0
envisioned either "'a brief or a stenographic report of the evidence."'8 s
Here, "rather than a stenographic report, the examiner filed a brief of
the evidence taken by him."8 2 That, the court concluded, "fully
complied with the alternative mandate" of the abandonment statute.8 3

74. Id. at 178, 633 S.E.2d at 590. "However, by a resolution approved by the Town
council, the mayor's authority to obligate the Town without consent of the Town council
was limited to $2,000." Id.
75. Id. The court relied upon O.C.G.A. section 45-6-5: "The public may not be estopped
by the acts of any [public] officer done in the exercise of an unconferred power.'" Griffin
Bros., 280 Ga. App. at 178, 633 S.E.2d at 590 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 45-6-5 (2002)).
Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial judge's award of summary judgment for the
municipality. Id. at 179, 633 S.E.2d at 591. For extensive treatment of local government
estoppel, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN GEORGIA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW (1985).
76. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-2-64 to -84 (1991 & Supp. 2007).
77. 280 Ga. 764, 632 S.E.2d 633 (2006).
78. Id. at 764, 632 S.E.2d at 634. The plaintiff claimed that the city had abandoned
one-half of a named street and sought to register title to it. Id.
79. Id.
80. O.C.G.A. § 44-2-103(b) (1991 & Supp. 2007).
81. A A OK, Ltd., 280 Ga. at 764, 632 S.E.2d at 634 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
O.C.G.A. § 44-2-103(b)).
82. Id., 632 S.E.2d at 635.
83. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-2-103(b)). "Under the circumstances, the trial court did
not err in basing its judgment upon the report filed by the examiner, without conducting
any review of a stenographic report of the oral testimony." Id. at 765, 632 S.E.2d at 635.
The court also upheld the trial judge in assessing costs against the plaintiff. Id. at 766,
632 S.E.2d at 635.
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G. Taxation
In earlier litigation, legal practitioners in the municipality successfully
challenged the city's occupation tax on attorneys.8 4 Subsequently, the
trial court divided the affected attorneys into Class I (who had made no
claim for refunds) and Class II (who had previously made such
Still later, the trial court held members of Class I
demands).,s
obligated to exhaust their administrative remedies before making refund
claims for the years not barred by the limitation period. 6
In Barnes v. City of Atlanta, 7 the supreme court reviewed the
litigation's history and concluded that the ruling of unconstitutionality
should be applied retroactively to all viable class action tax refund
claims.8 8 "'The [municipality] unconstitutionally collected taxes from
all of these individuals,"'8 9 said the court, without discriminating
between those who demanded a refund and those who did not.90
"Limiting recovery only to those taxpayers with the foresight to have
demanded a refund is 'untenable in a case such as this, where the
matter is of constitutional import and where, in practical consequence,
the purpose of the [ordinance] was realized."''
H. Liability
The municipal liability issue reared its countenance throughout the
survey period and concerned several facets-some peculiar to the context
and others of a more general liability complexion.9 2 Among the latter,

84. City of Atlanta v. Barnes, 276 Ga. 449, 449, 578 S.E.2d 110, 111-12 (2003),
supersededby statute, O.C.G.A. § 48-2-35(c)(5) (Supp. 2007), as recognized in Barnes v. City
of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 256, 637 S.E.2d 4 (2006).
85. Barnes v. City of Atlanta, 275 Ga. App. 385, 385-86, 620 S.E.2d 846, 847 (2005),
rev'd, 281 Ga. 256, 637 S.E.2d 4.
86. Id. at 386, 620 S.E.2d at 848. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
actions. Id. at 395, 620 S.E.2d at 854.
87. 281 Ga. 256, 637 S.E.2d 4 (2006).
88. Id. at 259, 637 S.E.2d at 7.
89. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 6 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bailey v. State, 500 S.E.2d 54, 75
(N.C. 1998)).
90. Id.
91. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 6-7 (brackets in original) (quoting Bailey, 500 S.E.2d at 75).
92. For perspective on all municipal liability issues, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
GeorgiaLocal Government Tort Liability:The "Crisis"Conundrum,2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19
(1985); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of'92, 9 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 405 (1993); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Liability Litigation:
Numerical Nuances, 38 GA. L. REV. 633 (2004).
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Georgia Department of Transportation v. Strickland9 3 featured a
motorist's claim against a municipality for injuries suffered when she
parked her car on Main Street and then fell when she stepped into a
Emphasizing the plaintiff's acknowledged status as a
pothole.94
"licensee" at the time of her injury (and thus entitled only to conduct not
wilful or wanton),95 the court of appeals stressed her general awareness
"of the potholes in the parking area."9" Indeed, "she had previously
parked in the same parking space where her fall occurred and ...
nothing obstructed her view of the potholes in that area."9 7 Accordingly, the plaintiff's "knowledge of the hazard was at least equal to that of
the City," and she merited no recovery.9
Falling within the more specialized context of sovereign immunity,
Scott v. City of Valdosta99 presented an action for false arrest based on
mistaken identity.' 0 Although conceding negligence on the part of law
enforcement officers, the court of appeals saw no viable avenue to the
claimant's avoidance of the immunity bar.'0 ' The plaintiff had produced no policy of municipal insurance,"2 and "a determination of a

93. 279 Ga. App. 753, 632 S.E.2d 416 (2006).
94. Id. at 753, 632 S.E.2d at 417. The plaintiff also sued the State Department of
Transportation, but likewise to no avail. Id.
95. Id. at 754, 632 S.E.2d at 418. "Because [the plaintiff] was a licensee, the City...
'owed only the duty not to injure her wilfully and wantonly."' Id. (quoting Spear v.
Calhoun, 261 Ga. App. 835, 837, 584 S.E.2d 71, 73 (2003)).
96. Id. at 755, 632 S.E.2d at 419.
97. Id.
98. Id. The court reversed the trial judge's denial of summary judgment to the
municipality. Id. at 753, 632 S.E.2d at 417.
Yet another slip-and-fall complaint received disposition on general litigation principles
in Williams v. City of Atlanta, 280 Ga. App. 785, 635 S.E.2d 165 (2006). There, the
plaintiff sued for injuries suffered in a fall at the municipal airport; the city mailed the
complaint to its insurer, but it was never received, and no answer was filed. Id. at 785-86,
635 S.E.2d at 166. Reversing the trial judge's setting aside of the plaintiffs default
judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect, the court reasoned as follows: "The City did
not rely on assurances from the insurer that it had received the complaint and was
preparing an answer. And 'it is undisputed that [the City] did nothing to ensure that the
complaint had been received by the insurance company or that an answer would be filed."
Id. at 787, 635 S.E.2d at 167 (brackets in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Wright v.
Mann, 271 Ga. App. 832, 833, 611 S.E.2d 118, 120 (2005)). The court thus concluded on
an emphatic note: "Such inaction, especially by a law department, cannot constitute
excusable neglect." Id.
99. 280 Ga. App. 481, 634 S.E.2d 472 (2006).
100. Id. at 481, 634 S.E.2d at 474. The plaintiff suffered arrest and incarceration on
the basis of an outstanding warrant for someone else. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 485, 634 S.E.2d at 477. Relying upon O.C.G.A. section 36-33-1, the court
reasoned that the plaintiff must show that the city's sovereign immunity had been waived
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waiver of immunity cannot be established if an insurance policy has not
been furnished.",1 3 Indeed, "without a waiver of sovereign immunity,"
the court concluded, "the City cannot be held liable for the actions of the
arresting officer because no evidence shows that the officer was0 4not
'engaged in the discharge of the duties imposed on [him] by law.' "
The municipality may also escape liability on the basis of immunity
not inhering in its sovereignty but rather in its capacity as a landowner.1" 5 In Carroll v. City of Carrollton,'° a motorcyclist was injured
when he skidded on roadway debris and crashed into a cable fence at a
city park. 10 7 To the plaintiff's charges of negligence in both road
maintenance and fence construction, the city defended under the
Recreational Property Act 0 . ("RPA"), a statute encouraging "'property
owners to make their property available to the public for recreational
purposes by limiting the owners' liability."' 10 9 Sustaining that defense,
the court of appeals discounted the fact that the claimant's accident
originated on the public road rather than recreational property; the
RPA's applicability "hinges on where [the plaintiff] sustained his
injuries, not on where the accident started.""0 Equally immaterial
was the absence of any intent by the rider to use the park at the time

by insurance and that the city "has the discretion to decide whether to purchase liability
insurance." Scott, 280 Ga. App. at 485, 634 S.E.2d at 477 (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1
(2006)).
103. Id. (citing City of Lawrenceville v. Macko, 211 Ga. App. 312, 314, 439 S.E.2d 95,
98 (1993)).
104. Id. at 485-86, 634 S.E.2d at 477 (brackets in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-33-3
(2006)). "Therefore, in the absence of any evidence as to the existence and extent of
liability insurance, the trial court did not err by granting judgment to the City." Id. at 486,
634 S.E.2d at 477. The court, along similar lines of analysis, also affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs claim against the county. Id.
105. See, e.g., Carroll v. City of Carrollton, 280 Ga. App. 172, 173-76, 633 S.E.2d 591,
593-95 (2006).
106. 280 Ga. App. 172, 633 S.E.2d 591 (2006).
107. Id. at 173, 633 S.E.2d at 593. The plaintiff alleged that municipal trucks "had
tracked mud, dirt, and gravel [from a city playground parking lot] into the roadway,"
causing his motorcycle to slide and to enter onto city property where it struck a cable fence
around the playground. Id.
108. Id.; O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-20 to -26 (2000). "If the RPA applies in a given case, it
'shields [the] landowner [] from liability arising under a negligence cause of action."'
Carroll, 280 Ga. App. at 174, 633 S.E.2d at 593 (brackets in original) (quoting Julian v.
City of Rome, 237 Ga. App. 822, 823, 517 S.E.2d 79, 80 (1999)).
109. Carroll, 280 Ga. App. at 173-74, 633 S.E.2d at 593 (quoting Cooley v. City of
Carrollton, 249 Ga. App. 387, 388, 547 S.E.2d 689, 690-91 (2001)).
110. Id. at 175, 633 S.E.2d at 594. The court emphasized that "it is undisputed that
[the plaintiffs] injuries were sustained when he collided with the cable fence on the City's
recreational property [and] the RPA clearly is applicable." Id.
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he was injured."' "Since it 'is undisputed on appeal that the City
for recrepermitted the general public to use the park and open 1field
2
ational purposes without charge, the RPA applies here."
Finally, the supreme court confronted a novel issue regarding the
"ante litem notice" mandate-the prohibition of claims for money
damages unless written notice is provided to the municipality within six
months of the offending event.1 3 In Atlanta Taxicab Co. Owners Ass'n
v. City of Atlanta,"4 the claimant sought damages for an alleged
procedural due process violation inflicted by an ordinance requiring
taxicab certificates." 5 The plaintiff filed its complaint in July 2004
without having provided the city with the necessary notice. Subsequently, it amended its complaint, withdrawing all claims for damages, and
in October 2004, it provided the notice. In November 2004, having
again amended its complaint and
received no city response, the plaintiff
6
reasserted the claim for damages."

111. Id. Rather, "the central focus is on how the landowner permits the general public
to use the property; if the landowner 'directly or indirectly invites or permits [others] to use
the property for recreational purposes' without charge, the owner is afforded the
protection[] of the RPA." Id., 633 S.E.2d at 594-95 (first brackets in original) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Ga. Dep't of Transp. v. Thompson, 270 Ga. App. 265, 267,606 S.E.2d 323,
326 (2004)).
112. Id. at 175-76, 633 S.E.2d at 595. In yet another claim falling under the RPA,
Collins v. City of Summerville, 284 Ga. App. 54, 643 S.E.2d 305 (2007), a child injured on
a city park swing sought to avail himself of the Act's immunity exception for the city's
wilful or malicious failure to warn. Id. at 54, 643 S.E.2d at 306-07. Rejecting that
effort-based on the plaintiffs charge of a defective chain "S-hook"-the court held that
written installation instructions are "not sufficient to create a jury issue as to whether the
City had actual knowledge of these dangers, as no evidence was presented that any
employee of the City read these instructions." Id. at 57, 643 S.E.2d at 308. As the court
concluded, "Given the constraints of the Recreational Property Act's actual knowledge
requirement, we cannot infer actual knowledge under these circumstances." Id.
113. See O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 (2006). For treatment of the mandate, its history, and the
circumstances of its applicability, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT
LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 145-74 (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia MunicipalTort
Liability: Ante Litem Notice, 4 GA. L. REV. 134 (1969); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Ante Litem
Notice: Cause for Pause, URBAN GA. MAG., Oct. 1978, at 24. For a recent analysis of
modern developments, see monograph, R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., ANTE LITEM NOTICE:
RECENT PERSPECTIVES (2006).
114. 281 Ga. 342, 638 S.E.2d 307 (2006).
115. Id. at 342, 638 S.E.2d at 310-11. For discussion of substantive aspects of the case,
see supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
116. Atlanta Taxicab, 281 Ga. at 351, 638 S.E.2d at 316. The trial court held the
plaintiffs' actions procedurally invalid under the ante litem mandate and dismissed the
claim for damages. Id. at 351-52, 638 S.E.2d at 316.
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Appraising the plaintiff's efforts, a majority of the court stressed the
impermissible in order to delineate the permissible. 117 "Because the
giving of ante-litem notice is a condition precedent to bringing suit
against a municipality, the notification itself cannot be accomplished by
amendment after suit has been filed.""' Here, however, the plaintiff
dismissed its original claim by amendment to the complaint, "gave the
City pre-litigation notice and then again amended [its] complaint to
reallege the claim."" 9 This tactic "satisfied the procedural requirement of giving the City an opportunity to investigate the claim so as to
determine whether to settle it without resort to litigation."12 Accordingly, the court held the plaintiff procedurally free to pursue damages
for alleged violations
occurring in the six months prior to the October
21
ante-litem notice.'
I.

Zoning

The issue of municipal zoning emerged in City ofRoswell v. Fellowship
Christian School, Inc.,122 concerning the city's refusal to grant a
conditional use permit for the school's construction of a football
stadium. 123
Reviewing the plaintiff's petition for mandamus, the
2 4
supreme court employed a two-pronged justification for its denial.
First, a municipal ordinance expressly vested the city with discretion in

117. See id. at 350, 638 S.E.2d at 315.
118. Id. at 351, 638 S.E.2d at 315. "To the extent that City of Atlanta v.Fuller holds
otherwise, it is hereby overruled." Id., 638 S.E.2d at 316 (citation omitted) (citing City of
Atlanta v. Fuller, 118 Ga. App. 563, 164 S.E.2d 364 (1968) overruled by Atlanta Taxicab,
281 Ga. 342, 638 S.E.2d 307).
119. Id., 638 S.E.2d at 316.
120. Id.
121. See id. "The trial court erred in concluding that the [plaintiff] was procedurally
barred from pursuing that claim for such alleged violations of due process as occurred in
the six months prior to October 8, 2004 when the ante-litem notice was given." Id. A
dissenting opinion for three justices viewed the plaintiffs ante litem efforts as ineffective:
"I cannot endorse the [plaintiffs] sleight of hand." Id. at 359, 638 S.E.2d at 321 (Benham,
J., dissenting).
122. 281 Ga. 767, 642 S.E.2d 824 (2007).
123. Id. at 767, 642 S.E.2d at 825. The school had sought the permit for construction
of several new buildings, including the stadium, and following opposition from residents
in the neighborhood, the city approved the permit minus the stadium. Id.
124. Id. " ' Mandamus will issue against a public official only where the petitioner has
demonstrated a clear legal right to relief or a gross abuse of discretion."' Id. (quoting
Gwinnett County v. Ehler Enters., 270 Ga. 570, 570, 512 S.E.2d 239, 240 (1999)); see also
R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW
(1989).
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126
acting on the application;' 25 and second, "[t]here was evidence"
supporting the permit's denial "based upon the negative impact the
stadium would have on traffic in the area."'27 As for the plaintiff's
equal protection contention, the court assumed an equally adverse
position: "[T]he evidence that [the school's] proposed stadium would
exacerbate an already existing traffic problem
in the area is a rational
28

basis for the denial of the application."

II.

COUNTIES

A.

Officers and Employees
Dissension among county officers and employees accounted for several
instances of period litigation. In Duggan v. Leslie, 2 9 for example, the
chair of the county commissioners sought a declaratory judgment
130
acknowledging his sole authority to hire and fire county employees.
In reviewing the issue, the court of appeals found general law to permit
local statute control of the matter 3 ' and examined local legislation
providing for the chair's powers and duties.'32 Those provisions, the
court reasoned, rendered the power to hire and fire implicit:'33 "[Tihe
power to hire and fire is reasonably necessary for the chairperson to
carry out [the] express authority to administer, supervise, operate, and

125. Fellowship Christian Sch., 281 Ga. at 768, 642 S.E.2d at 825. Accordingly, the
ordinance did not mandate approval of the application "as a matter of right." Id.
126. Id. at 769, 642 S.E.2d at 826. Under its "any evidence" standard of review, the
court explained, the issue "'is whether there is any evidence supporting the decision of the
local governing body.'" Id. at 768, 642 S.E.2d at 825 (quoting Fulton County v.
Congregation of Anshei Chesed, 275 Ga. 856, 859, 572 S.E.2d 530, 532 (2002)).
127. Id. at 769, 642 S.E.2d at 826. Reversing the trial judge, the court found no abuse
of discretion on the part of the municipality. Id.
128. Id. at 770, 642 S.E.2d at 826. "The superior court erred in finding that [the
plaintiff] had a viable equal protection claim based upon denial of its application to build
the stadium." Id., 642 S.E.2d at 827.
129. 281 Ga. App. 894, 637 S.E.2d 428 (2006).
130. Id. at 894, 637 S.E.2d at 429.
131. Id. "'By local law, a county may delegate power over any of these issues to the
chairperson or chief executive officer of the county governing authority.'" Id. (quoting
Krieger v. Walton County Bd. of Comm'rs, 269 Ga. 678, 680, 506 S.E.2d 366, 368 (1998)).
132. Id. at 894-95, 637 S.E.2d at 429 (citing 1984 Ga. Laws 3815).
133. Id. at 895-96, 637 S.E.2d at 430. "While the local laws governing [the] County do
not explicitly address whether the board or chairperson has general power to hire and fire
county employees, we find it is implicit in the statute read as a whole." Id.

2007]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

301

control the county departments, agencies, and offices."' 34 Accordingly,
13
the court reversed the trial judge's decision against the chairman. 1
Putnam County v. Adams 36 featured a county's effort to require the
former county attorney to return all its files,'3 7 only to suffer the trial
court's order that the county pay for copies of closed files.13 Reversing, the court of appeals determined there was "no distinction in Georgia
law between closed and open files."' 39 Rather, "[tihe client is presumptively entitled to have both types returned absent 'good cause.' "140
Indeed, "where there are no unpaid legal services the client is entitled
to the return of his or her papers and property, as well as documents
created by the attorney in the course of representing the client.""'
Aspects of law enforcement prompted the dissension in Hill v. Clayton
County Board of Commissioners,'4 ' with the commissioners protesting
the sheriff's unauthorized modifications to his vehicles and suite of
offices.' 43 Splitting the issues, the court of appeals first concluded that
the county's police vehicles were assigned to the sheriff's exclusive
use.'
The new markings conformed to the governing statute,' 45 and
"the Sheriff was entitled to determine that the law enforcement

134. Id. at 896, 637 S.E.2d at 430. "[We find that the local laws vest the chairperson
with authority to hire and fire county employees without the approval of the board." Id.
The court held that a 2004 board resolution changing that authority was invalid because
it was not effected by ordinance. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 430-31.
135. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 431. "Since the trial court concluded erroneously that the
chairman 'does not have the sole authority to hire and fire county employees,' we must
reverse." Id.
136. 282 Ga. App. 226, 638 S.E.2d 404 (2006).
137. Id. at 226, 638 S.E.2d at 405. The defendant had served as the county attorney
for roughly three years, "and a dispute arose as to the procedure for transferring the files
to a new county attorney." Id.
138. Id. at 226-27, 638 S.E.2d at 405. The trial court held the county entitled to all
open files and that "the County was entitled to copy any closed files at its own expense."

Id.
139. Id. at 228, 638 S.E.2d at 406.
140. Id. (quoting Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers v. Henry, 276 Ga. 571,573,581 S.E.2d
37, 39 (2003)).
141. Id.
142. 283 Ga. App. 15, 640 S.E.2d 638 (2006).
143. Id. at 15, 640 S.E.2d at 640. The commissioners sought a declaratory judgment
that any modifications to the motor vehicles or to the office facilities were subject to the
board's prior approval. Id.
144. Id. at 17, 640 S.E.2d at 641-42. Additionally, the sheriff is not an employee of the
county commissioners. Id. at 16, 640 S.E.2d at 641.
145. Id. at 15-16, 640 S.E.2d at 640. 'The new decals and the old decals conformed to
the requirements of [O.C.G.A. section] 40-8-91, which sets the criteria for marking official
vehicles used for traffic enforcement." Id. at 15, 640 S.E.2d at 640 (citing O.C.G.A. § 40-891 (2004)).
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functions to which the vehicles were assigned would be more competently performed if the vehicles were repainted and remarked."14 6 Contrarily, modifications to the sheriff's offices within the county Justice
Center entailed different principles. The sheriff enjoyed no exclusive use
of the Center, and statutes vested the commissioners with control over
county buildings.'4 7
Thus, "material alterations and structural
changes to a county building such as the Justice Center must be made
at the48 Board's direction and not on the Sheriff's independent initiative." 1

The survey period by no means omitted typical issues of workers'
compensation and health benefits. As for the former, Goswick v. Murray
County Board of Education4 9 featured an appeal from the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") suspension of disability benefits when the
employee refused to undergo a physical examination.5 0 Noting the
workers' compensation board's adoption of the ALJ's decision, its
affirmance by the superior court, and the "any evidence" standard of

146. Id. at 18, 640 S.E.2d at 642. This included the addition of the sheriffs name to
the new markings. Id. As for the sheriffs paying for the changes with forfeited drug funds
distributed to him by federal agencies, the court held that "local legislation must yield to
the general law requiring that funds forfeited under federal law be utilized by the law
enforcement agency to which it is transferred." Id. at 19, 640 S.E.2d at 643 (citing
O.C.G.A. § 16-13-48.1 (2007)).
147. Id. at 20, 640 S.E.2d at 643; O.C.G.A. § 36-9-5(b) (2006).
148. Hill, 283 Ga. App. at 20, 640 S.E.2d at 643. The court thus reversed the trial
judge's decision for the commissioners regarding the vehicles but affirmed the decision
regarding the offices. See id. at 15, 640 S.E.2d at 640.
Law enforcement also provided context for Davis v. Pinson, 279 Ga. App. 606, 631 S.E.2d
805 (2006), a rather peripheral decision of the period in which a county police officer
escorting a funeral procession sued the defendant who motioned a car to turn in such
fashion as to strike the officer. Id. at 606, 631 S.E.2d at 805-06. Rejecting the defendant's
employment of the "Fireman's Rule" (public officers "'cannot complain of negligence in the
creation of the very occasion"' for their presence), id., 631 S.E.2d at 806 (quoting Kapherr
v. MFG Chem., Inc., 277 Ga. App. 112, 115, 625 S.E.2d 513, 516 (2005)), the court
reasoned as follows: "Here [the defendant's] alleged negligence in motioning a car to turn
into the cemetery had nothing to do with [the officer's] presence at the scene." Id. at 608,
631 S.E.2d at 806. On grounds that the Fireman's Rule should be narrowly construed, the
court held the police officer free to sue for the defendant's alleged negligence. Id.
149. 281 Ga. App. 442, 636 S.E.2d 133 (2006). For an overview of workers' compensation in the local government law context, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Workers' Compensation
in Georgia Municipal Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 57 (1981).
150. Goswick, 281 Ga. App. at 442, 636 S.E.2d at 134. The plaintiff had received
disability payments since 2001, underwent extensive treatment by a specialist, and was
finally advised to return to his original doctor when he thought it necessary. Some
eighteen months later, the employer requested the plaintiff to return to that doctor for
examination to determine his current medical status. The plaintiff refused to do so. Id. at
442-43, 636 S.E.2d at 134.
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review, the court of appeals scrutinized the governing statute.1 5 1
Denying the statute to require examination by an "independent"
physician (rather than the plaintiff's treating doctor),152 the court was
adamant: "[T]he plain language of the statute ... only requires that the
examining physician be duly qualified, not that the physician be
independent nor that the physician not be treating the claimant.",5 3
Accordingly, the court affirmed suspension of the plaintiff's benefits.'
As for health insurance, Benefit Support, Inc. v. Hall County'5
focused upon the county's procedure for finding an insurance provider.
156
That procedure included the county's employment of a consultant
and its later rejection of the plaintiff provider's lowest bid. The plaintiff
charged that the consultant lacked a proper license, a charge causing the
county to declare the bidding process tainted and to throw out all bids.
Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the county for wrongful rejection of its
low bid, seeking bid preparation costs, and alleging, inter alia, a
violation of equal protection. 5 ' Rejecting the plaintiff's arguments, the
court of appeals noted the plaintiff's "disappointment that it shot itself
in the foot by pointing out [the consultant's] lack of a license and thereby
had its bid also rejected."'
That, however, "is hardly grounds for a
viable complaint against the county, which simply reacted to this news
in a prudent and cautious manner by exercising its right set forth in the
[request for proposals] to reject all bids."' 59 Similarly unyielding to the

151. Id. at 443, 636 S.E.2d at 135; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-202 (2004).
152. Goswick, 281 Ga. App. at 444, 636 S.E.2d at 135. The plaintiff "maintains that
traditionally, such exams are done by 'independent' physicians who are not treating the
claimant, and that in the past the Board has not relied on this statute to compel an exam
by the claimant's treating physician." Id.
153. Id. "This accords with our obligation to strictly construe the workers' compensation statute." Id.
154. Id. at 442, 636 S.E.2d at 134. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiffs
"blatant defiance of an ALJ order which he chose not to appeal was some evidence that [the
plaintiffl defended the proceedings in part without reasonable grounds," thereby justifying
the award of attorney fees. Id. at 447, 636 S.E.2d at 137.
155. 281 Ga. App. 825, 637 S.E.2d 763 (2006).
156. See id. at 826, 637 S.E.2d at 767. The county publicized a "Request for Proposals"
and invited sealed bids on the county's health insurance needs, reserving the right to reject
any or all bids. Id.
157. Id. at 826-27, 637 S.E.2d at 767.
158. Id. at 828, 637 S.E.2d at 768.
159. Id. at 828-29, 637 S.E.2d at 768. "[T]he county had ample if not overwhelming
reason to conclude that the entire process was tainted and unreliable and should therefore
be rejected." Id. at 828, 637 S.E.2d at 768. Thus, "[t]he trial court did not err in granting
the county summary judgment on [the plaintiffs] 'frustrated bidder' claim in its complaint
alleging that the county violated its bidding rules and regulations." Id. at 829, 637 S.E.2d
at 768.
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plaintiff's equal protection complaint, the court determined its "rational
basis" standard of review to be well satisfied.16 "Here, because of the
taint to the process, all bids were rejected, and thus no classification was
created at all. There could hardly be
a clearer example of similarly
161
situated persons being treated alike."

B.

Powers
Perhaps the most noteworthy "power" case of the period, Walker

County v. Tri-State Crematory 6' arose from the gruesome discovery
that a crematorium had failed to bury hundreds of corpses over a period
of many years. 16 ' The county sued the crematorium (and certain
funeral homes and directors), asserting both negligence and public
nuisance, and claiming "the expenses it [had] incurred in recovering,
identifying, and properly disposing of the human remains."164 Reviewing the trial judge's dismissal, the court of appeals canvassed authorities
from both Georgia'65 and elsewhere.1 66 "[W]e conclude," the court
announced, "that Georgia, like many jurisdictions, has adopted the
common-law free public services doctrine,", 67 a doctrine under which
"a county cannot recover the costs of carrying out public services from
a tortfeasor whose conduct caused the need for the services." 68 So

160. Id. at 829-30, 637 S.E.2d at 769.
161. Id. "The county did not exercise arbitrary power but acted rationally and
reasonably in rejecting all bids across the board." Id. at 830, 637 S.E.2d at 769.
162. 284 Ga. App. 34, 643 S.E.2d 324 (2007).
163. Id. at 34-35, 643 S.E.2d at 325-26. Responding to the emergency, the county
"established a crisis center, morgue, and other facilities and took steps to recover, move,
store, and identify human remains and provide for their burial and proper disposition."
Id. at 35, 643 S.E.2d at 326.
164. Id. at 34, 643 S.E.2d at 325. The county also sought punitive damages and
attorney fees and costs. Id., 643 S.E.2d at 325-26. The county "alleged multiple negligence
claims and further alleged that the presence of uncremated human remains scattered in,
on, or around the crematorium property constituted a public nuisance for which all the
defendants could be held liable." Id. at 35, 643 S.E.2d at 326.
165. Id. at 36, 643 S.E.2d at 327 (citing Torres v. Putnam County, 246 Ga. App. 544,
541 S.E.2d 133 (2000)).
166. Id. at 37, 643 S.E.2d at 327. "The seminal case in this area of the law is City of

Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry]. Co., 719 F.2d 322, 323-24 (9th Cir.
1983) .
" Tri-State Crematory, 284 Ga. App. at 37 n.2, 643 S.E.2d at 327 n.2.
167. Tri-State Crematory, 284 Ga. App. at 36-37, 643 S.E.2d at 327 (footnote omitted).
168. Id. at 37, 643 S.E.2d at 327. This doctrine operated, said the court, "absent
specific statutory authorization or damage to government-owned property."
Id.
Necessarily, the county's claims for punitive damages and attorney fees failed as well. Id.
at 40, 643 S.E.2d at 329.
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adopted,
the "free public services doctrine" barred the county's ac69
tion. 1

Litigation touched an assortment of other county powers during the
survey period, generally with discouraging results. 7 '
In Fulton
County v.Perdue,'7' the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the county's
effort to cabin the reach of a 2005 statute'72 imposing "new requirements upon counties that have created [special taxing and spending
districts ("SSD")] for the provision of services to their unincorporated
areas."17 3 More specifically, the court rejected the county's position
that the statute applies "only when noncontiguous areas are first created
by the incorporation of a new municipality."'74 Taking a broader view,
the court found "nothing in the language of [the statute] indicating a
legislative intent that it apply only to SSDs with newly created
noncontiguous areas."'
Rather, "'any special district taxes, fees, and
assessments collected in such a noncontiguous
area shall be spent to
17 6
provide services in that noncontiguous area.''
County fortunes did not improve in Forsyth County v. Georgia
Transmission Corp.,177 where the supreme court invalidated an

ordinance purporting to require electric power utility companies
("EPUC") to obtain county approval before constructing high voltage
transmission lines. 7 8
First, the court emphasized the following

169. Id. In mitigation, the court maintained that [the statutory framework set forth
in [O.C.G.A.] Title 41 provides a means for counties to recoup the costs of abating a public
nuisance, albeit indirectly, through obtaining a lien and instituting an enforcement
proceeding." Id. at 39, 643 S.E.2d at 329 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 41-2-7(b), -9(a)(7), (b) (1997
& Supp. 2007)).
170. E.g., Fulton County v. Perdue, 280 Ga. 807, 631 S.E.2d 362 (2006).
171. 280 Ga. 807, 631 S.E.2d 362 (2006).
172. Id. at 807, 631 S.E.2d at 363; O.C.G.A. § 36-31-12 (2006).
173. Perdue, 280 Ga. at 807, 631 S.E.2d at 363. Previously, the county had not "limited
the expenditure of such revenue to the area in which it was collected." Id.
174. Id. at 808, 631 S.E.2d at 364.
175. Id.
176. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-31-12(b) (2006)). The court likewise rejected the
county's argument that the statute unconstitutionally encroached on the county's exclusive
authority derived from a 1972 local amendment to the constitution. Id. at 810, 631 S.E.2d
at 365; 1972 Ga. Laws 1481. "[W]e hold that the 1972 amendment did not grant [the
county] exclusive authority to control the expenditure of revenue collected in its SSD."
Perdue, 280 Ga. at 810, 631 S.E.2d at 365.
177. 280 Ga. 664, 632 S.E.2d 101 (2006).
178. Id. at 664, 632 S.E.2d at 102. The utility had initiated plans to construct a high
voltage transmission line along a fifteen to twenty mile corridor through the county in
2002, and the county had adopted its ordinance in 2004. Id. "Under the new ordinance,
[the utility] must apply for a zoning map amendment for its proposed power line corridor,
and obtain overlay zoning approval from the county for its construction or operation." Id.
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exception contained in the constitution's county home rule provision:
"[P]owers granted to counties... 'shall not be construed to extend to'...
[any] '[a]ction affecting the exercise of the power of eminent domain. ' 179 Secondly, the court highlighted a general statute 8 0 authorizing "an EPUC to exercise the power of eminent domain to effectuate
the purpose of furnishing electric power and service."' 8 ' Necessarily,
the court concluded, "the [county] ordinance must fail."8 2 Finally, the
court likewise rebuffed the county's contention that the constitution's
expansive grant of county zoning power prevailed over the home rule
proscription." 3 Both provisions appear in the same article and section
of the constitution, said the court, and such provisions "must be
construed in pari passu."'" Accordingly, the zoning power enjoyed no
"greater dignity" than the home rule exclusion.'
The county faired better-still falling short of complete success-in
Johnson v. Fayette County,5 6 concerning the validity of its "County
Marshal's Department."8 7 On the one hand, the supreme court
affirmed summary judgment that the county had validly created the
department in 1983 without a referendum as it was then authorized to
do. 8
On the other hand, the court reversed a decision that the

at 665, 632 S.E.2d at 102.
179. Id. at 666, 632 S.E.2d at 103 (second and third brackets in original) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(c)(6)). For background on the history and
operation of local government home rule in Georgia, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Home Rule
Benefits or Homemade Problemsfor Georgia Local Government?, 4 GA. ST. B.J. 317 (1968);
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "Home Rule": Its Impact on Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. ST.
B.J. 277 (1972); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government "HomeRule": A Place to Stop?, 12
GA. L. REV. 805 (1978); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Home Rule System, 50 MERCER
L. REV. 99 (1998).
180. Ga. Transmission Corp., 280 Ga. at 666, 632 S.E.2d at 102; O.C.G.A. § 46-3201(b)(9) (2004).
181. Ga. Transmission Corp., 280 Ga. at 666, 632 S.E.2d at 103.
182. Id. at 667, 632 S.E.2d at 104. "The ability to deny power line corridor applications
and halt projects means that the county would be empowered to frustrate [the utility's]
purpose by affecting its power of eminent domain." Id.
183. Id. at 667-68, 632 S.E.2d at 104; GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 4.
184. Ga. Transmission Corp., 280 Ga. at 667, 632 S.E.2d at 104.
185. Id. at 667-68, 632 S.E.2d at 104. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's decision
favoring the utility and holding the county ordinance unconstitutional. Id. at 664, 632
S.E.2d at 102.
186. 280 Ga. 493, 635 S.E.2d 35 (2006).
187. Id. at 493-94, 635 S.E.2d at 36. The county sheriff had refused to jail persons
detained by marshals from the Department, challenging the validity of its existence as an
authorized county police force. Id.
188. Id. at 494, 635 S.E.2d at 36. "It is undisputed that the County, acting by and
through its Board of Commissioners and pursuant to the authority of [O.C.G.A. section] 368-1, established the [department] in 1983." Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-8-1 (2006)).
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department was operational in 1992 and thus validly "grandfathered"
under a general statute so as to escape the referendum requirement.18 9
On this latter issue, the court noted evidence authorizing "an inference
that the [department], although authorized to operate as a county police
force on January 1, 1992, was not in operation and existence as such
police force as of January 1, 1992." 19' This evidence created genuine
issues of material fact not amenable to summary judgment.19 '
C.

Openness
County open meeting complaints arose in distinctive contexts during
the survey period-and garnered contrasting receptions by the supreme
court.' 9'
EarthResources, LLC v. Morgan County'93 presented a
challenge to the county's actions in denying a verification of zoning
compliance for a proposed landfill.' 94 First, the court determined there
was no error in the county's posting notice of the meeting at its regular
meeting place, such notice advising that the meeting would be held at
an alternate site.' 95 It was "plain," said the court, "that the notice
sufficiently complied with the [open meetings] statute."'96 Second, the
court reviewed the commissioners' posting of the meeting agenda at their
offices but not at the alternate site where the meeting was held.' 97
Although terming these actions "a technical violation of the statute," the
court determined there was no evidence that it "deprived [the plaintiff]
of a fair and open consideration of its request or in any way impeded the
98
remedial and protective purposes of the Open Meetings Act."

189. Id. "The General Assembly amended [O.C.G.A. section] 36-8-1 in 1992 ... to
require voter approval of a resolution or ordinance creating a county police force before it
can become effective." Id. That amendment, however, "includes a 'grandfather' clause
rendering the referendum requirement ... inapplicable" to a previously created
department remaining in existence and operational in 1992. Id.
190. Id. at 495, 635 S.E.2d at 37. That evidence consisted of testimony by two previous
county officials that the department was not operating as a valid police force in 1992. Id.
191. See id., 635 S.E.2d at 36-37.
192. For perspective, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Omen of "Openness" in Local
Government Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 97 (1978).
193. 281 Ga. 396, 638 S.E.2d 325 (2006).
194. Id. at 398, 638 S.E.2d at 327-28. "On appeal, [the plaintiff] raises two Open
Meetings Act issues. . . ." Id., 638 S.E.2d at 328 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -6 (2006)).
195. Id. at 398-99, 638 S.E.2d at 328. The plaintiff charged a violation of O.C.G.A.
section 50-14-1(d). EarthResources,281 Ga. at 398, 638 S.E.2d at 328.
196. EarthResources,281 Ga. at 399, 638 S.E.2d at 328.
197. Id. O.C.G.A. section 50-14-1(e)(1) requires that the meeting agenda "shall be
posted at the meeting site." O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(e)(1).
198. EarthResources,281 Ga. at 399, 638 S.E.2d at 328-29. Indeed,
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The county claimed an exception to the Open Meetings Act in Decatur
County v. Bainbridge Post Searchlight, Inc.:199 a closed meeting to
consult with legal counsel "'pertaining to pending or potential litigation. '' 20 0 There, the grand jury had found presentments questioning
the propriety of certain commissioners' actions and sent those presentments to the county attorney.2 ' At their regular meeting, the commissioners retired into executive session with the attorney to discuss their
response.21202 A majority of the court made short work of rejecting the
county's claim to the attorney-client exception: "[I]t is clear that the topic
of the meeting related to the manner in which the county's business was
being conducted and, as such, the purpose was to fashion a political
response, not to prepare a legal defense."20 3 "Indeed," 20 the
court
4
emphasized, "there was not even a threat of any litigation."

Under the unusual circumstances of the present case, in which [the plaintiff] first
advocated a closed meeting and later objected to permitting public participation
in the consideration of its request, we consider the posting of the agenda at the
regular meeting place of the Board of Commissioners rather than at the actual
meeting site to be sufficient compliance with the statute's requirements.
Id. at 399-400, 638 S.E.2d at 329. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of
summary judgment to the county on the open meetings issue. Id. at 401, 638 S.E.2d at
329.
199. 280 Ga. 706, 632 S.E.2d 113 (2006).
200. Id. at 707, 632 S.E.2d at 115 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-14-2(1)).
201. Id. at 706, 632 S.E.2d at 114-15. The presentments questioned the manner in
which the commissioners handled employees' vacation and overtime policies, and the
district attorney sent the presentments to the county attorney to give the commissioners
an opportunity to respond prior to the documents being filed with the superior court and
their publication. Id.
202. Id. Subsequently, the plaintiff newspaper sent an open records request to review
the documents referred to by the minutes of the closed meeting, and the commissioners
claimed those documents not available for public inspection because the session came under
the attorney-client exception to the Open Meetings Act. Id.
203. Id. at 708, 632 S.E.2d at 116. "In this case, there was no 'pending or potential
litigation."' Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-14-2(1)).
204. Id. "[T]he trial court properly rejected the Commissioners' claim of 'attorneyclient' privilege as 'remote and speculative,' rather than 'realistic and tangible.'" Id.
(quoting Claxton Enter. v. Evans County Bd. of Comm'rs, 249 Ga. App. 870, 874, 549
S.E.2d 830, 834-35 (2001)). The court also rejected the commissioners' reliance on the
grand jury secrecy provision, O.C.G.A. section 15-12-80 (2005): "The Commissioners cannot
evade the obligation to conduct an open meeting by relying upon a veil of secrecy which the
grand jury itself disregarded" when it sent the presentments to the county attorney.
Bainbridge, 280 Ga. at 709, 632 S.E.2d at 116.
A two-justice dissent maintained that the responses prepared by the commissioners in
the meeting in issue would be used to determine what charges the grand jury might pursue
against them. Id., 632 S.E.2d at 117 (Melton, J., dissenting). "These acts are directly
analogous to discovery in a pending suit. As such, it cannot be maintained that the
Commissioners were not subject to potential litigation. Therefore, their decision to conduct
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Emphasis shifted to the Open Records Act2" 5 in Athens Newspapers,
LLC v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County," 6 regarding the
plaintiff's request for police records on an unsolved 1992 rape and
murder. ° 7 Rejecting the county's reliance upon the Act's "pending
investigation" exemption,2"' the court of appeals explicated its findings
as follows:
[Tihe undisputed evidence in this case shows that there has been no
progress in solving the ... murder for several years, there is no
ongoing, active investigation of the case by the county, there are no
suspects or evidence that will likely lead to identifying a suspect, and
there is only a slight possibility that the county's submission of the
DNA to a database will ever result in progress in solving the case.2"0
Accordingly, the court directed the trial judge to grant summary
judgment for the newspaper.210
D.

Contracts

The scrutinized period's contracts controversy materialized in Harden
v. Clarke County Board of Education,211 a former high school teacher's
quantum meruit suit against the county school board and officials,
claiming compensation for additional duties assigned to him.212 The

a closed meeting was proper under the attorney-client exception .... " Id.
205. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to -77 (2006 & Supp. 2007).
206. 284 Ga. App. 465, 643 S.E.2d 774 (2007).
207. Id. at 465, 643 S.E.2d at 775. Although the crime had occurred in 1992, no one
had been arrested, no possible perpetrator had been identified, and no new evidence had
been discovered in several years. Id.
208. Id. at 466-67, 643 S.E.2d at 775-76 (citing O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4)). O.C.G.A.
section 50-18-72(a)(4) exempts "[r]ecords of law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory
agencies in any pending investigation." O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4). Said the court:
"Essentially, the county argues that, as long as there is no arrest or prosecution in the...
case, its investigation will remain 'pending'... indefinitely." Athens Newspapers, 284 Ga.
App. at 468, 643 S.E.2d at 777.
209. Athens Newspapers, 284 Ga. App. at 469, 643 S.E.2d at 778. The court noted the
statute's direction that exemptions be narrowly construed. Id. at 469-70, 643 S.E.2d at 778
(citing O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4)).
210. Id. at 470, 643 S.E.2d at 778. Additionally, the court held that "the three business
day response clock starts running upon delivery of the records request to the government
agency [rather than] upon delivery to the individual in charge of the records." Id. at 47172, 643 S.E.2d at 779.
211. 279 Ga. App. 513, 631 S.E.2d 741 (2006).
212. Id. at 513, 631 S.E.2d at 742. The plaintiff had sued for breach of contract and
later amended his complaint to add a claim in quantum meruit. When the trial court
granted adverse summary judgment, the plaintiff appealed only the court's judgment on
his quantum meruit claim. Id.
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Georgia Court of Appeals rejected the action on two substantive
fronts.2 13 First, the court highlighted the venerable statutory command that all county contracts "shall be in writing and entered on its
Because "'quantum meruit is another name for an
minutes."214
implied contract,"' the court reasoned, by definition "'quantum meruit
is not available when a county is a defendant.' 215 Additionally, the
court drew governmental immunity into the quantum meruit context as
well: "Sovereign immunity bars [the plaintiff's] claim in quantum
meruit against a political subdivision of the state, 'including counties,
county boards of education and county school districts. '' 2 6 As for
actions against officials in their individual capacities-not alleging
intent-these were precluded by the concept of
negligence, malice, 21or
"official immunity." 7
E.

Roads

Given the historic prominence of rural roads in Georgia county
government and the early preoccupation of county commissioners with
maintaining them, the period's subject cases bode somewhat ironic: both
contests featured a county's denial of road ownership. Shearin v. Wayne
Davis & Co. 2" s highlighted two procedures dealing with a county

213. See id. at 513-14, 631 S.E.2d at 742.
214. Id. at 513, 631 S.E.2d at 742 (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-10-1 (2006)). For an analysis
of this statute, its history, and application by the courts, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., County
Contracts in Georgia: "Written and Entered,"32 MERCER L. REV. 283 (1980).
215. Harden, 279 Ga. App. at 513-14, 631 S.E.2d at 742 (quoting Brown v. Penland
Constr. Co., 276 Ga. App. 522, 524, 623 S.E.2d 717, 719 (2005)).
216. Id. at 514, 631 S.E.2d at 742 (quoting Coffee County Sch. Dist. v. Snipes, 216 Ga.
App. 293, 295, 454 S.E.2d 149, 150 (1995)). Sovereign immunity also protected the
defendant officials sued in their official capacities. Id.
217. Id. (citing GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9). The court thus affirmed the trial judge's
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. at 513, 631 S.E.2d at 742.
In an additional contracts case of the period, McArthur Electric, Inc. v. Cobb County
School District, 281 Ga. 773, 642 S.E.2d 830 (2007), the supreme court ruled adversely to
a subcontractor's action against a school district for an equitable lien on funds owed by the
district to the general contractor on a school construction project. Id. at 775, 642 S.E.2d
at 832. Noting the statutory requirement that a general contractor on a public works
project provide a payment bond, the court deemed that bond "a remedy which is at least
as practical and efficient" as lien rights. Id. Accordingly, the plaintiff "could not assert an
equitable lien against the School District as an additional remedy to the adequate legal
remedies it has against the General Contractor and the sureties on the payment bond."
Id.
218. 281 Ga. 385, 637 S.E.2d 679 (2006). The case featured an effort by property
owners to mandamus the county to maintain the unpaved road in issue. Id. at 385, 637
S.E.2d at 679. On the problems of the mandamus action, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR.,
MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LocAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1989).
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obtaining prescriptive title to a road: (1) by possession for twenty years
while meeting stated requirements 219 and (2) by unlimited public use
for at least seven years.2 2 ° The county maintained that these "two
methods of prescription ... are not two methods, either of which would
221
result in prescription, but are two parts of the only method.
Rejecting that position, a majority of the supreme court read statutory
language of the second (and later) method "to provide a more expeditious
and less burdensome alternative means" and not simply "to add another
requirement."22 2 Expressly disapproving prior decisions,223 the court
held county compliance with the first method to trigger the road's
prescriptive acquisition.224

In Rabun County v. Mountain Creek Estates, LLC, 22' a developer

sought both mandamus and inverse condemnation relief for the county's
refusal to accept dedication of subdivision roads. The county defended
on grounds that the road shoulders failed the width requirements of a
county ordinance. 22' Reversing a jury verdict of inverse condemnation,227 the supreme court viewed the case to present "not a taking of
property, but a refusal to take property. ' 22 ' That claim suffered the

219. Shearin, 281 Ga. at 385, 637 S.E.2d at 679-80 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 44-5-161, -163
(1991)).
220. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 680 (citing O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3(c) (2006)).
221. Id. at 386, 637 S.E.2d at 680. The county conceded that it had met the
requirements of the first method but insisted that it had not adversely acquired the road
unless it met the second method as well. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 387 n.5, 637 S.E.2d at 681 n.5 (citing Chandler v. Robinson, 269 Ga. 881,
882, 506 S.E.2d 121, 122 (1998); Harbor Co. v. Copelan, 256 Ga. App. 79, 82, 567 S.E.2d
723, 725-26 (2002); Irwin County v. Owens, 256 Ga. App. 359, 361, 568 S.E.2d 578, 581
(2002)).
224. Id. at 388, 637 S.E.2d at 681-82. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial judge's
grant of the mandamus against the county. Id. Two justices dissented: "I ... believe that
this Court's binding precedent demonstrates that compliance with the requirements of both
[O.C.G.A. section] 32-3-3(c) and [section] 44-5-161 is necessary before a governmental body
obtains prescriptive title to a road." Id., 637 S.E.2d at 682 (Carley, J., dissenting).
225. 280 Ga. 855, 632 S.E.2d 140 (2006).
226. Id. at 855, 632 S.E.2d at 142. "The County contends that (the plaintiff] did not
prove that the shoulders of its roads were two-feet wide, as required by the Ordinance....
Id. at 858, 632 S.E.2d at 144.
227. See id. at 855-56, 632 S.E.2d at 142-43.
[The plaintiffs] contention about the roads it constructed is the opposite of a true
claim for inverse condemnation. [The plaintiffs] argument rests not on an act of
commission resulting in a taking based on the diminishment of functionality of its
land, but on an act of omission resulting in a failure to take or a "no-taking" which
had no effect on functionality.
Id. at 856, 632 S.E.2d at 143.
228. Id. at 857, 632 S.E.2d at 143.
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defeat of sovereign immunity.229 Contrarily, the plaintiff's mandamus
action enjoyed a better fate. 2"° Emphasizing its "any evidence" standard of review, 23 1 the court canvassed sufficient testimony "to support
the jury's finding of fact that [the plaintiff] had complied with the [ordinance's] shoulder requirement."23 2 Accordingly, the court affirmed a
mandamus that the county accept the roads.233
F

Taxation

No subject stirs more attention in local government circles than
taxation, and two cases of the period tested the authority of county
officials in administering the system. Vesta Holdings, LLC v. Freeman 234 presented a scenario under which the plaintiff had purchased
county tax executions,235 and the sheriff-having adjudged the executions invalid-refused to execute the levy.2 "6 Reversing the trial
judge's denial of the plaintiff's mandamus petition, the supreme court
emphasized the sheriff's statutory duty "'to execute and return the
processes and orders .. .of officers of competent authority, if not void,
with due diligence when delivered to him for that purpose.' ' 237 Even
if ultimately correct on the point of invalidity, "the Sheriff is not a
judicial officer, and he [was] therefore not entitled to make that
determination."232
The tax execution appeared valid on its face, the

229. Id., 632 S.E.2d at 144. "[Tlhe County was entitled to sovereign immunity against
[the plaintiffs] claim for damages." Id.
230. See id. at 856, 632 S.E.2d at 143. "This is an archetypal mandamus claim, to
which that area of the law is uniquely suited...." Id.
231. See id. at 858, 632 S.E.2d at 144. "[Tlhere is some evidence that the subdivision
roads met the Ordinance's requirements for shoulders." Id.
232. Id. at 859, 632 S.E.2d at 145. The court relied on portions of testimony by the
road builder and by the county's own expert. See id. at 858-59, 632 S.E.2d at 144.
233. Id. at 860, 632 S.E.2d at 146. Three justices concurred in part and dissented in
part. See id. at 861, 632 S.E.2d at 146 (Sears, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
234. 280 Ga. 608, 632 S.E.2d 87 (2006).
235. Id. at 608-09, 632 S.E.2d at 87-88. The tax commissioner had issued the
executions against a railroad for real estate located in the county. The plaintiff had
purchased the executions and placed them in the hands of the sheriff for levy. Id.
236. Id. The sheriff contended that the railroad property was subject to taxation only
by the state and that no county tax was owed on it. Id.
237. Id. at 609, 632 S.E.2d at 88 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 15-16-10(a)(1) (2005 & Supp.
2006)).
238. Id. at 610, 632 S.E.2d at 88. "The proper party to challenge the validity of the tax
assessments, rather, is the taxpayer against whom the tax has been assessed, and the
proper forum to do so is a judicial one." Id.
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court asserted, and "the Sheriff [had] no discretion or authority to
239
decline to enforce it."
The county tax commissioner enjoyed administrative success in
Mulligan v. Security Bank of Bibb County.2 0 There, the plaintiffs had
defaulted on a loan, the bank foreclosed on the subject property, and the
sale proceeds paid all expenses.24 ' The plaintiffs then challenged the
tax commissioner's authority to employ surplus sale funds to pay past
due ad valorem taxes.242 The court of appeals rejected that challenge:
"[W]hile a tax commissioner retains a lien on the property that is
enforceable against a subsequent purchaser of the property, the prior
owner also remains liable for the taxes."2 4
Accordingly, "the tax
commissioner was authorized to seek payment of the outstanding taxes
from the surplus proceeds."244
Finally, Johnstone v. Thompson 24 shifted attention to more substantive concerns surrounding a county's special purpose local option sales
tax ("SPLOST").246 Initially, the supreme court quoted the statutory
mandate that SPLOST proceeds be used "'exclusively for the purpose or
purposes specified in the resolution or ordinance calling for imposition
of the tax.' ''247 Generalities in place, the court appraised a local
taxpayer's complaint by examining the county resolution reimposing the

239. Id., 632 S.E.2d at 89. "It does not further the interests of justice and order to
allow the Sheriff to act as a judicial officer in determining the validity of an execution that
isissued by the Tax Commissioner and is valid on its face." Id. The plaintiff, the court
held, was entitled to a mandamus. Id.
240. 280 Ga. App. 248, 633 S.E.2d 629 (2006).
241. Id. at 248-49, 633 S.E.2d at 630. After payment of the secured debt and all sale
expenses, there remained a surplus in an amount greater than the tax commissioner's
claim for ad valorem taxes on the property for the years 2001 to 2004. Id.
242. Id. at 249, 633 S.E.2d at 630-31. The plaintiffs contended that the purchaser of
the property at sale incurred the tax liability as a part of his purchase. Id.
243. Id. at 250, 633 S.E.2d at 631 (emphasis omitted) (citing Teachers Ret. Sys. of Ga.
v. City of Atlanta, 249 Ga. 196, 202 n.6, 288 S.E.2d 200, 204 n.6 (1982)). "Under Georgia
law, ad valorem taxes are chargeable either as a personal debt of the taxpayer or as a lien
'which extends not only to the property giving rise to the tax obligation, but also to all
other property owned by the taxpayer.'" Id. at 249, 633 S.E.2d at 631 (quoting Nat'l Tax
Funding, L.P. v. Harpagon Co., 277 Ga. 41, 42, 586 S.E.2d 235, 237 (2003)).
244. Id. at 250, 633 S.E.2d at 631. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' contention that
the language of the notice of sale precluded collection of taxes from the surplus sales
proceeds. See id.
245. 280 Ga. 611, 631 S.E.2d 650 (2006).
246. See id. at 611, 631 S.E.2d at 651. Such taxes find authorization in GA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 6, para. 4(a).
247. Johnstone, 280 Ga. at 612, 631 S.E.2d at 651 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 48-8-121(a)(1)
(2005)).
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2 41 the ballot language for the measure,24 9 and the "noteSPLOST,
book" distributed to obtain voter approval. 5 None of those sources,
the court concluded, supported the county school board's decision to use
$59 million of the tax to provide a laptop computer for every middle and
high school student in the school district.2 1' Accordingly, "[t]he
evidence authorized the trial court to find that [the defendants] failed to
comply with their clear legal duties when they sought to 're-budget' the
technology initiatives," and entitled the plaintiff to a mandaoriginal
2 52
mus.

Liability
Claimants sought county liability in diverse contexts during the survey
period and received equally diverse responses from the appellate
In Stanfield v. Glynn County,254 homeowners claimed
courts.253
"nuisance" recovery for an adjacent waste transfer facility originally
G.

248. Id. at 611-12, 631 S.E.2d at 650-51. The resolution specified the use of funds for
system-wide technology improvements. Id.
249. Id. at 612, 631 S.E.2d at 651. The ballot language mentioned equipment and
technology systems. Id.
250. Id. The notebook specified the refreshing of obsolete workstations. Id.
251. Id. at 611, 614, 631 S.E.2d at 651-52. The court viewed the evidence to authorize
the trial court to find "that the general language in the referendum and ballot about
technology improvements and technology systems referred to the proposed capital outlay
projects detailed in the SPLOST notebook." Id. at 613, 631 S.E.2d at 652. The court
likewise approved the trial court's rejection of the defendants' argument that the computer
project
was the functional equivalent of the SPLOST notebook project to "refresh obsolete
workstations," given that the [computer project] provided laptop computers only
to middle and high school students, whereas the SPLOST notebook project
specified it was for the purpose of updating computer laboratory workstations used
by all of the school district's students, elementary as well as middle and high
schools.
Id. at 613-14, 631 S.E.2d at 652 (footnote omitted).
252. Id. at 614, 631 S.E.2d at 652-53. "[W]e reject [the defendants'] argument that [the
plaintiff] had no clear legal right to the mandamus relief granted in this case." Id., 631
S.E.2d at 653. Two justices dissented: "Neither case law nor statutory authority supports
a finding that the [county school board] abused its discretion by allocating SPLOST tax
proceeds to a small pilot program of its Power to Learn initiative." Id. (Melton, J.,
dissenting).
253. For perspective on county liability (and immunity), see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Georgia Local Government Tort Liability:The "Crisis"Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19
(1985); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of'92, 9 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 405 (1993); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Liability Litigation:
Numerical Nuances, 38 GA. L. REV. 633 (2004).
254. 280 Ga. 785, 631 S.E.2d 374 (2006).
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constructed under county building permits. 255 Explaining that a
county nuisance must equate to "inverse condemnation" to entail
responsibility, the supreme court could identify no such violation.256
"The County neither owns nor is charged with the ongoing maintenance
of [the waste] facility," observed the court, and its issuance of building
permits "does not subject it to any liability for inverse condemnation or
for any claim rising to that level."257
The plaintiffs of the period directed a large majority of their actions
directly against county officers or employees themselves.258 Freeman

255. Id. at 785, 631 S.E.2d at 377. The plaintiffs complained of odors, noise, dust, and
other inconveniences resulting from the facility. See id. at 788, 631 S.E.2d at 379. The
county had issued building permits for the facility's construction "from 1992 to 1997." Id.
at 785, 631 S.E.2d at 377.
256. Id. at 786, 631 S.E.2d at 377-78. "Counties, unlike municipalities, can be liable
for conditions created on private property only under the constitutional eminent domain
provisions .... " Id., 631 S.E.2d at 377. "Thus, the trespass and nuisance claims are
duplicative of the inverse condemnation claim." Id. For analysis of a Georgia county's
unique nuisance responsibility, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia County Liability:Nuisance
or Not?, 43 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1991).
257. Stanfield, 280 Ga. at 786, 631 S.E.2d at 377 (citing Morris v. Douglas County Bd.
of Health, 274 Ga. 898, 898, 561 S.E.2d 393, 395 (2002)). "Likewise, the County's issuance
of citations for violation of the nuisance ordinance does not show that it was responsible
for maintaining a nuisance, but rather that it was enforcing that ordinance." Id. The court
thus affirmed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment in favor of the county. Id. at
799, 631 S.E.2d at 379.
Lack of causation also doomed the plaintiffs action in Purvis v. Steve, 284 Ga. App. 116,
643 S.E.2d 380 (2007), where the defendant county deputy's "patrol car collided with a
deer, apparently causing the deer's severed head to strike [the plaintiffs decedent] through
the windshield of her oncoming vehicle." Id. at 116, 643 S.E.2d at 382. According to the
evidence, the court of appeals concluded, "[t]he sole proximate cause of the accident was
the deer's sudden appearance in the roadway, which was not foreseeable or avoidable by
[the deputy] and was the cause of [the decedent's] injuries." Id. at 119, 643 S.E.2d at 384.
The court held both deputy and county entitled to summary judgment. Id.
The court of appeals found the plaintiffs claim equally illusive in Johnson County School
District v. Greater Savannah Lawn Care, 278 Ga. App. 110, 629 S.E.2d 271 (2006), an
action for a school district employee's negligence in causing the plaintiff to wreck one of its
trucks and to suffer a resulting loss of business profits. See id. at 110, 629 S.E.2d at 27273. The court held that neither the profits history of the plaintiffs predecessor nor
evidence of the plaintiffs scheduled receipts provided "the required specificity for
calculating an amount of [the plaintiffs] lost profits directly traceable to a wrongful act by
the defendants." Id. at 113, 629 S.E.2d at 274. The court thus reversed the trial judge's
denial of the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. Id. at 114, 629 S.E.2d at
275.
258. For treatment of personal liability litigation in local government law, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers:Rights for their Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REV. 747
(1979); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia Local Government Law: The
HauntingHiatus of Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993); R. Perry
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v.- Barnes25 9 featured a claim for the sheriff's gross security negligence
leading to a superior court judge's murder while on the bench. The
sheriff defended on grounds that he and the judge were co-employees of
both the county and the state; thus, the tort action must bow to the
exclusive remedy of workers' compensation.2 ° Rejecting that position,
the court of appeals deemed the judge a state but not a county employee261 and the sheriff a county but not a state official.262 Accordingly,
the court
affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment for the plain263
tiff.

Clive v. Gregory 2l targeted the county building inspector for failing
to inspect the plaintiffs' newly constructed barn which subsequently
collapsed in a wind gust.265

Against the plaintiffs' complaint of

resulting damages,266 the inspector sought protection by the "public
duty doctrine"-a precept limiting an official's legal duty to the general
public rather than to any particular individual. 26 7 Reversing the trial

Sentell, Jr., "Official Immunity" in Local Government Law: A Quantifiable Confrontation,
22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 597 (2006).
259. 282 Ga. App. 895, 640 S.E.2d 611 (2006).
260. Id. at 895, 640 S.E.2d at 612. The court of appeals agreed that "[uinder [O.C.G.A.
section] 34-9-11(a), the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for
injuries sustained by an employee during the course of employment resulting from the
negligence of a co-worker." Freeman, 282 Ga. App. at 896, 640 S.E.2d at 613 (citing
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a) (2004)).
261. Freeman, 282 Ga. App. at 898-99, 640 S.E.2d at 614-15. The court reasoned that
superior court judges exercise state judicial power, are statutorily defined as state officials
for compensation purposes, and serve a circuit and not simply a county in a circuit. Id.
Finally, the judge's participation in a county pension and retirement plan does not
constitute him a county employee. Id. Accordingly, the judge 'was not a ... County
employee as well as a state employee." Id. at 899, 640 S.E.2d at 615.
262. Id. at 899, 640 S.E.2d at 615. The court reasoned that "the constitutional and
statutory provisions relating to the office of sheriff ... support[] the conclusion that he is
not a state official, but a county official." Id.
263. Id. at 896, 640 S.E.2d at 613.
264. 280 Ga. App. 836, 635 S.E.2d 188 (2006).
265. Id. at 837-38, 635 S.E.2d at 191. The plaintiffs subsequently discovered that the
barn had been constructed without the wall bracing required by the county code. Id. at
837, 635 S.E.2d at 191. "Apparently, it was not the practice of [the defendant's] office at
that time to inspect barns, [sic] or to issue certificates of occupancy for barns." Id. at 838,
635 S.E.2d at 191.
266. Id. at 837, 635 S.E.2d at 191. Both plaintiffs had suffered both physical injury and
property damage when the barn collapsed. Id.
267. Id. at 839, 635 S.E.2d at 192.
Under the public duty doctrine, "liability does not attach where the duty owed by
the governmental unit runs to the public in general and not to any particular
member of the public, except where there is a special relationship between the
governmental unit and the individual giving rise to a particular duty owed to that
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court's acceptance of that defense, the court of appeals emphasized the
supreme court's limitation of the doctrine to the context of "police
protection."268 Overruling its own previous extension of the principle
to building inspectors,269 the court held the defendant in Clive devoid
of "public duty" protection.2 70
Typically, most of the individual liability litigation implicated the
doctrine of "official immunity."271 Under that principle, officers sued in
their "individual capacity" enjoy "qualified" or official immunity for
"discretionary functions" performed without malice or intent. Officers
sued in their individual capacity for "ministerial functions" enjoy no such
immunity for their negligent conduct.27 2
Uniquely, the plaintiff park patron in Norton v. Cobb 273 sought to
hurdle both sovereign and official immunity, maintaining their "waiver"
by the Recreational Property Act ("RPA), 274 a statute intended,
ironically, "to encourage both public and private landowners to make
their property available to the public for recreational purposes by
limiting the owners' liability."275 Alleging injury resulting from a
defective swing chain at a county park, the plaintiff sued both the

individual."
Id. (quoting City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 27, 426 S.E.2d 861, 862 (1993) (adopting
the public duty doctrine)). For analysis, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia's Public Duty
Doctrine: The Supreme Court Held Hostage, 51 MERCER L. REV. 73 (1999).
268. See Clive, 280 Ga. App. at 840-41, 635 S.E.2d at 193. The court quoted from the
supreme court's decisions in Departmentof Transportationv. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 471 S.E.2d
849 (1996), and Rowe v. Coffey, 270 Ga. 715, 515 S.E.2d 375 (1999), where "the operative
language in these Supreme Court decisions is 'police protection,' not police powers." Clive,
280 Ga. App. at 841, 635 S.E.2d at 193.
269. Clive, 280 Ga. App. at 841, 635 S.E.2d at 193 (citing City of Lawrenceville v.
Macko, 211 Ga. App. 312, 439 S.E.2d 95 (1993), overruled by Clive, 280 Ga. App. 836, 635
S.E.2d 188)). "[N]o matter how well reasoned" its decision in Macko may have been, said
the court, it is "inconsistent with these decisions of our Supreme Court, [and] it must be
overruled." Id.
270. See id. The court thus reversed the trial judge's grant of summary judgement to
the building inspector on the basis of the public duty doctrine. See id.
271. For background on that doctrine and analysis of its current status in the courts,
see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers: Rights for their Wrongs, 13
GA. L. REV. 747 (1979); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia Local
Government Law: The Haunting Hiatus of Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 405 (1993); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "Official Immunity" in Local Government Law: A
Quantifiable Confrontation,22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 597 (2006).
272. See sources cited supra note 271.
273. 284 Ga. App. 303, 643 S.E.2d 803 (2007).
274. Id. at 303, 643 S.E.2d at 805; O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-20 to -26 (2000).
275. Norton, 284 Ga. App. at 305, 643 S.E.2d at 806 (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20).
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county and its maintenance employee 276 and received summary
disposition from the court of appeals. 7 As for the county, "the trial
court erred in finding that the RPA waived [its] sovereign immunity;"278 as for the employee's inspection of the swing, he "was entitled

to official immunity, which cannot be waived." 279 The court thus
declared both defendants deserving of summary judgment.28 °
The court of appeals likewise applied official immunity in Tant v.
Purdue,211 an action against a county police officer whose investigation
282
of a traffic accident resulted in charges against the plaintiff.
Although those charges were later dropped, the court characterized the
officer's conduct as "discretionary" when "he concluded from his
investigation that [the plaintiff] had been driving recklessly and under
the influence and when [the officer] signed the arrest warrant application to that effect."283 Absent evidence of malice, the officer's official
immunity doomed the plaintiff's action. 8 4

276. See id. at 303, 643 S.E.2d at 805. The plaintiff alleged that, while a minor, he was
using the park swing previously inspected by the defendant employee when the "S" hook
attaching the swing chain to the seat broke and caused him to fall on his back. Upon
attaining the age of eighteen, the plaintiff instituted an action against the county and the
employee. Id. at 304, 643 S.E.2d at 805.
277. Id. at 306, 643 S.E.2d at 807. "[By its terms, [the RPA] limits liability of entities,
private or public, which allow their property to be used without charge for recreational
purposes." Id., 643 S.E.2d at 806-07 (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20).
278. Id., 643 S.E.2d at 807.
279. Id. at 307, 643 S.E.2d at 807 (citing GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(d)). Even the
trial court had determined the employee to be exercising a discretionary function in
examining the swing and that he was not guilty of "actual malice." Id. at 306, 643 S.E.2d
at 807.
280. Id. at 307-08, 643 S.E.2d at 807-08. Additionally, the court held the defendants
entitled to the protection proper of the RPA as well-the plaintiff did not trigger the
statute's exception in showing "'that the condition is not apparent to those using the
property.'" Id. at 307, 643 S.E.2d at 807 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ga.
Marble Co. v. Warren, 183 Ga. App. 866, 867, 360 S.E.2d 286, 287 (1987)). The defective
"S" hook "would have been obvious to anyone using the equipment," said the court, and the
defendants were thus entitled to the immunity provided by the RPA. Id. at 308, 643
S.E.2d at 808.
281. 278 Ga. App. 666, 629 S.E.2d 551 (2006).
282. Id. at 666-67, 629 S.E.2d at 552. The plaintiff had struck another vehicle, killing
his wife, and the defendant officer had originated charges of several traffic offenses
including vehicular homicide and DUL. Id. at 667, 629 S.E.2d at 552-53. The plaintiff
argued that the officer's conduct consisted of "ministerial acts." Id. at 668, 629 S.E.2d at
553.
283. Id. at 668, 629 S.E.2d at 553.
284. See id. The court held the record "devcid of any evidence suggesting that [the
officer] acted with actual malice in the course of his duties" and affirmed the trial judge's
summary judgment against the plaintiff. Id. The court wasted no effort in reaching a
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The court pursued a similar tact in Daley v. Clark, 5 an action by
parents of a high school student who suffered cardiac arrest during an
after school fight.28 The plaintiffs sued first-responding law enforcement officers, alleging violation of a ministerial duty in failing to
perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR").25 7 Following extensive
review of the evidence, the court found "[n]o statute, legal precedent, or
departmental policy [which] mandates the performance of CPR, however
prudent it might be under the circumstances."2 8 The defendants
"were confronted with a possible homicide scene in addition to a medical
emergency," the court reasoned, and "[t]he manner in which they decided
to assist the victim ... was a judgment call." 2 9 "[On the basis of

similar conclusion in Hersh v. Griffith, 284 Ga. App. 15, 643 S.E.2d 309 (2007), an action
against two off-duty county police officers operating police escort vehicles for a house
mover. Id. at 15, 643 S.E.2d at 311. Responding to the plaintiff motorist who collided with
the house and affirming directed verdicts for the officers, the court reasoned that the
officers "exercised their own personal judgment deciding in what lanes to drive, how to
signal oncoming traffic, when to stop oncoming traffic, etc." Id. at 21, 632 S.E.2d at 315.
As the court concluded, "[c]ontrolling traffic is a discretionary function," there were no
allegations of actual malice, and the defendant officers were entitled to official immunity.
Id.
Finally, Touchton v. Bramble, 284 Ga. App. 164, 643 S.E.2d 541 (2007), yielded the same
response concerning a county detective who exercised "'personal judgment and deliberation,'" id. at 167, 643 S.E.2d at 545 (quoting Reed v. DeKalb County, 264 Ga. App. 83, 86,
589 S.E.2d 584, 587 (2003)), in arresting the plaintiff for indecent exposure at an
amusement park. Id. at 164, 643 S.E.2d at 542. The court held the officer's evidence
sufficient to raise a jury question (although the jury ultimately found the plaintiff not
guilty) and that the officer's "failure to take additional investigative steps does not show
the actual malice or intent to injure necessary to strip him of official immunity." Id. at
168, 643 S.E.2d at 545.
285. 282 Ga. App. 235, 638 S.E.2d 376 (2006).
286. Id. at 235, 638 S.E.2d at 378. A fellow student punched the plaintiffs' son in the
back of the head, causing sudden cardiac arrest. Id.
287. Id. at 236, 238, 638 S.E.2d at 378, 380. The plaintiffs contended that this duty
derived from department policies and procedures. Id. at 238, 638 S.E.2d at 380.
288. Id. at 245, 638 S.E.2d at 384.
289. Id., 638 S.E.2d at 385. "The uncontradicted evidence showed that no defendant
was certified at the time to perform CPR. Surely whether to perform CPR on a crime
victim who has sustained a possible brain injury or whether to wait for better trained
personnel calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment." Id.
Somewhat similarly, also see the period case of Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga. App. 282, 643
S.E.2d 814 (2007), a student's action against school personnel for sexual molestation by a
school employee with a prior record. Id. at 283, 643 S.E.2d at 816. The court of appeals
appraised the crux of the plaintiffs complaint to charge negligent supervision and observed
that numerous previous decisions had established school supervision to be a discretionary
function. Id. at 285-86, 643 S.E.2d at 816-17. "Thus, the fact that the supervisory duties
placed upon appellants were incorporated into an internal school policy document-the
1992 Memorandum-does not transform those duties into ministerial ones." Id. at 286, 643
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official immunity," therefore, the officers enjoyed a summary judgment.2 9 °
The supreme court adopted an analogous approach in Phillips v.
Hanse,291 an action for the death of a driver struck by a suspect fleeing
a county police officer.292 Reviewing prior cases,293 the court denominated the officer's decision to engage in the high-speed chase "a
discretionary act," a characterization unchanged by his violations of the
county police manual. 294 Next, the court addressed the issue of "actual
malice" by observing evidence that the officer "intentionally bumped the
fleeing vehicle."295 Although possibly "reckless,"29 s the court delineated, that conduct revealed no intention "to physically harm the suspect
intent to do wrong within the
or any bystander" and, thus, no "deliberate
297
meaning of the term 'actual malice.',

In a different-and shaping-procedural context, the court of appeals
drew the line in Bajani v. Gwinnett County School District,29" an

action against school officials and personnel for severe injuries inflicted
by one high school student upon another.299 In considering the

S.E.2d at 817. The defendants were thus held entitled to official immunity. Id.
290. Daley, 282 Ga. App. at 247, 638 S.E.2d at 386. "Telling a student to 'shut up' does
not evidence a deliberate intention to harm [the victim]. Even moving away persons who
were trying to help does not show malice, given the undisputed testimony that they were
afraid the persons might harm him.. . ."Id.
291. 281 Ga. 133, 637 S.E.2d 11 (2006).
292. Id. at 133-34, 637 S.E.2d at 11-12. The trial court had denied the defendant
officer's motion for summary judgment, the court of appeals had reversed, and the supreme
court granted certiorari. See id. at 133, 637 S.E.2d at 11-12.
293. E.g., Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122, 549 S.E.2d 341 (2001); Logue v. Wright, 260
Ga. 206, 392 S.E.2d 235 (1990), superseded by statute, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-22(2) (2006), as
recognized in Brantley v. Dep't of Human Res., 271 Ga. 679, 523 S.E.2d 571 (1999).
294. Phillips, 281 Ga. at 134, 637 S.E.2d at 12. Evidence showed that the officer did
not come to a complete stop at stop signs and traffic lights and that he bumped the fleeing
vehicle in violation of the county police manual. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 136, 637 S.E.2d at 14. "[O]ur cases establish that actual malice requires
more than reckless conduct." Id.
297. Id. at 136-37, 637 S.E.2d at 14. Accordingly, "we conclude that the [ciourt of
[aippeals properly held that [the officer] was entitled to summary judgment on his claim
of official immunity from liability." Id.
298. 278 Ga. App. 866, 630 S.E.2d 103 (2006), rev'd, 282 Ga. App. 197,647 S.E.2d 254.
299. Id. at 866, 630 S.E.2d at 105. The victim had angered the attacking student in
the classroom, to the teacher's knowledge, and immediately after class the assailant
severely beat the victim, kicking him in the face and stomach and stomping on his head
while he lay unconscious on the concrete floor. The school principal and his assistant took
the victim to the school clinic where the school nurse cleaned his wounds, but no other
medical assistance was requested until the victim's mother arrived and demanded a 911
call. The victim's injuries proved to be quite serious and required extensive surgery and
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defendants' motion for a judgment on the pleadings, a majority of the
court initially focused on the plaintiffs' assertion that the school's safety
plan did not address security issues mandated by a Georgia statute. °0
On this claim, "the absence of a [safety] plan in the record necessitates
the reversal of the trial court's entry of judgment ...

against [the

plaintiffs]."30 ' Similarly, the defendants' observation of the victim's
condition "gave them reasonable cause to believe that an aggravated
battery had occurred, thereby giving rise to a ministerial duty to report
the incident under [a statutory provision]." 0 2 Finally, the court
appraised the personnel's alleged failure to obtain immediate medical
care: "[A] jury could find either that the defendants failed to provide [the
victim] with any medical attention in breach of a ministerial duty on
their part to do at least that, or that the care provided was so inadequate as to amount to no care at all."30 3 Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's grant of the defendants' motion for judgment on
the pleadings.3 4

treatment. Id. at 867-69, 630 S.E.2d at 105-06.
300. Id. at 871, 630 S.E.2d at 108 (citing O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1185 (2005)). O.C.G.A. section
20-2-1185(a) requires that "[elvery public school shall prepare a school safety plan to help
curb the growing incidence of violence in schools." O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1185(a). "Although [the
plaintiffs] acknowledge that a safety plan was developed for [the high school], they alleged
in their complaint and they assert on appeal that the plan does not address security issues
mandated by [O.C.G.A. section] 20-2-1185." Bajjani, 278 Ga. App. at 871, 630 S.E.2d at
108.
301. Bajiani, 278 Ga. App. at 871, 630 S.E.2d at 108. The court relied upon its recent
decision in Leake v. Murphy, 274 Ga. App. 219, 617 S.E.2d 575 (2005). Bajjani, 278 Ga.
App. at 871, 630 S.E.2d at 108.
302. Bajjani, 278 Ga. App. at 873,630 S.E.2d at 108-09 (citing O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1184(b)
(2005)). "Therefore, the [plaintiffs'] claim against defendants for failure to comply with the
statutory reporting requirements should not have been dismissed." Id. at 874, 630 S.E.2d
at 109. Even if the defendants' decisions were classified as discretionary, the court
reasoned, the plaintiffs had alleged "wilfulness and corruption as well as malice ('deliberate
intention to do wrong')." Id. at 874-75, 630 S.E.2d at 110 (quoting Merrow v. Hawkins, 266
Ga. 390, 391, 467 S.E.2d 336, 337 (1996)).
303. Id. at 874, 630 S.E.2d at 109-10. A dissenting opinion argued that "the
Superintendent and members of the Board of Education are clothed with official immunity
because deciding on the contents of the plan is discretionary." Id. at 876, 630 S.E.2d at 111
(Andrews, P.J., dissenting). Additionally, there was no "allegation of deliberate intent to
cause harm to [the victim] by the principal, assistant principal, and nurse." Id. at 877, 630
S.E.2d at 111. Finally, "the grant of the motion to dismiss on this ground was not error."
Id.
304. Id. at 866, 630 S.E.2d at 105 (majority opinion). Yet another procedural aspect
prompted the court's reversal of official immunity for a building inspector in Clive v.
Gregory, 280 Ga. App. 836, 635 S.E.2d 188 (2006), who had failed to inspect the plaintiffs'
newly constructed barn which then collapsed from a wind gust. Id. at 836-37, 635 S.E.2d
at 191. Because the defendant contended that no one requested an inspection and the
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The court yet again delineated concepts in Hicks v. McGee," 5 a claim
for a superior court clerk's negligence in failing to inform the Department of Corrections of a prisoner's sentence.0 6 Rejecting the clerk's
plea of official immunity for individual liability, the court deemed it
"clear that [the plaintiff] is asserting that the defendant[] failed to
perform the ministerial act of communicating his sentence."30 7 In
contrast, the plaintiff's complaint against the defendant in her official
capacity could not hurdle the barrier of sovereign immunity, and
suffered dismissal.0 8
H.

Zoning
In Stanfield v. Glynn County, °9 the supreme court denied homeowners' argument for deleting a solid waste transfer facility as a
permissible use under the county's "General Industrial" zoning
classification.310 Initially, the court construed the county's zoning
ordinance: "Waste transfer facilities come within the broad language
therein permitting industrial uses involving processing operations."311
As for conditions in the ordinance prohibiting obnoxious noise, odors, and

plaintiffs alleged such a request, "a question of fact exists on whether a request was made.
We find ...that if the evidence establishes that a request was made, [the defendant] then
had the ministerial duty to inspect the barn[] and thus would not be entitled to assert the
defense of official immunity." Id. at 843, 635 S.E.2d at 195.
Subsequent to this survey period, the judgment in Bajjani was reversed by the Georgia
Supreme Court in Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 647 S.E.2d 54 (2007).
305. 283 Ga. App. 678, 642 S.E.2d 379 (2007).
306. Id. at 678, 642 S.E.2d at 381. That failure resulted in the plaintiffs serving an
additional twenty-two months in prison following his sentence expiration. Id. Initially, the
court employed the "continuing tort doctrine" to reject the defendant's reliance upon the
statute of limitations. See id. at 679, 642 S.E.2d at 381. Here, the defendant's violation
of her "continuing duty to communicate [the plaintiffs] sentence to the Department of
Corrections resulted in continuous injury to [the plaintiff] in the form of an ever-increasing
illegal confinement that was not eliminated until [the plaintiff] was released from prison
.[and] filed suit six months after his release." Id.
307. Id. at 680, 642 S.E.2d at 382. The court rejected the defendant's contention that
the plaintiff was complaining of her discretionary act in failing to supervise. See id. The
court thus affirmed the trial court's denial of this portion of the defendant's motion to
dismiss. Id.
308. See id. at 681, 642 S.E.2d at 382-83. "We agree with the trial court's conclusion
that the [defendant is] entitled to sovereign immunity to the extent [she was] sued in [her]
official [capacity]." Id., 642 S.E.2d at 382.
309. 280 Ga. 785, 631 S.E.2d 374 (2006).
310. See id. at 788, 631 S.E.2d at 378; GLYNN COUNTY, GA., ZONING ORDINANCES
§ 720.2.
311. Stanfield, 280 Ga. at 787, 631 S.E.2d at 378. The court emphasized that zoning
ordinances must be strictly construed in favor of the property owner. Id.
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the like, these did not render the waste facility an unlawful use 12 but
rather placed the owner on notice "'that such noxious results will not be
allowed, 31
and
will be subject to regulation by the police power of the
3
County.'"

Two cases of the period involved county changes to residential zoning
restrictions. 314 Hollberg v. Spalding County31 5 featured an adjoining
landowner's challenge to the grant of a special zoning exception for oneacre lots in a proposed residential subdivision.1 6 Observing the twopronged test on standing-"substantial interest" and "special damage" 31 -the court of appeals first confronted the novel issue of the
plaintiff's status as devisee at the time the exception was granted.'
Looking to "probate rules for guidance," the court found that an
"inchoate title" to real property enjoyed legal protection 31 9 and, thus,

312. Id. at 787-88, 631 S.E.2d at 378. "Since the zoning ordinance here does not
contain any requirement for a determination of compliance with performance standards
prior to construction of an industrial facility, the language setting forth those standards
is properly construed as relating to subsequent enforcement." Id. at 787, 631 S.E.2d at
378.
313. Id. at 787-88, 631 S.E.2d at 378 (quoting the trial court's opinion in the case).
"Therefore, the trial court correctly held that a waste transfer facility is a permissible use
in a [General Industrial] district." Id. at 788, 631 S.E.2d at 378. Finally, the court rejected
the transfer facility's contention that the county nuisance ordinance's reference to
"'anything having an offensive odor'" was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 789, 631 S.E.2d
at 379 (quoting GLYNN COUNTY, GA., ORDINANCES § 2-16-237). The court said "the actual
definition of 'nuisance' in the ordinance is taken from current and past Georgia statutes."
Id.
314. BBC Land & Dev., Inc. v. Butts County, 281 Ga. 472, 640 S.E.2d 33 (2007);
Hollberg v. Spalding County, 281 Ga. App. 768, 637 S.E.2d 163 (2006).
315. 281 Ga. App. 768, 637 S.E.2d 163 (2006).
316. See id. at 768-69, 637 S.E.2d at 165-66. The plaintiff sought either certiorari or
declaratory judgment declaring null and void the county commissioners' grant of the special
exception for an adjoining proposed residential subdivision. Id. at 769, 637 S.E.2d at 166.
317. See id. at 772-73, 637 S.E.2d at 168-69. "[The plaintiff] argues that the trial court
erred in determining that he lacked standing to challenge the Board's approval of the
special exception pursuant to the substantial interest-aggrieved citizen test." Id. at 772,
637 S.E.2d at 168.
318. Id. at 772, 637 S.E.2d at 168. The plaintiff had inherited his property from his
mother who had died in 2003, but the county approved the special exception in 2004, before
the mother's estate was settled in 2005. Id. at 768-70, 637 S.E.2d at 165-67. "Whether a
devisee of real property has a substantial interest in a zoning decision so as to satisfy the
first prong of the test is a matter of first impression in this state." Id. at 772, 637 S.E.2d
at 168.
319. Id. at 772-73, 637 S.E.2d at 168-69. The court observed that an inchoate title in
realty can be voluntarily conveyed, can be the subject of a fraudulent conveyance, and is
an assignable property right. Id. at 773, 637 S.E.2d at 169.

324

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

provided a substantial interest to the challenger in the case."2 ° On the
remaining prong of special damage, however, the court stressed an
admission by the plaintiff's own counsel that "his property values had
actually increased since the grant of the special exception." 32 ' Accordingly, the court affirmed the plaintiff's lack of standing to challenge the
county's actions.322

The supreme court proved equally hospitable to county changes in
BBC Land & Development, Inc. v. Butts County,323 presenting the
following scenario: developers purchased and developed lands in
accordance with county zoning allowing homes of 1500 square feet; the
county then amended its zoning ordinance to raise minimum home sizes
to 2000 square feet; and developers subsequently sold lots to the plaintiff
builders who sought permits to build the smaller homes. Upon the
county's refusal to issue the permits, the plaintiffs contended that
developers' vested rights in the property had been transferable to
them." 4 In response, the court rejected the plaintiffs' analogy of
vested rights and nonconforming uses and upheld county refusal of the

320. Id. at 772-73, 637 S.E.2d at 168-69. "[W]e hold that such [inchoate] title is
sufficient to give [the plaintiff] a 'substantial interest' in the grant of the special exception
to [the adjoining owner]." Id. at 773, 637 S.E.2d at 169.
321. Id. at 774, 637 S.E.2d at 170. The court also noted greatly increased appraisals
of the plaintiffs property. See id. at 775, 637 S.E.2d at 170.
322. Id. at 775, 637 S.E.2d at 170. 'Given the expert testimony that the value of the
land had appreciated considerably since the date the special exception was granted, we find
no error in the trial court's ruling that [the plaintiff] failed to meet his burden of proving
standing to challenge the special exception." Id.
The "substantial interest-special damage" standing requirement itself drew the supreme
court's attention in Massey v. Butts County, 281 Ga. 244, 637 S.E.2d 385 (2006), more
specifically the continuing appropriateness of that test in cases where a property owner
seeks equitable means for attacking the county's issuance of a building permit. Here, a
landowner sought declaratory and injunctive relief for a county board of zoning appeals'
issuance of a building permit for a neighboring barn. Id. at 244-45, 637 S.E.2d at 386. The
court traced two seemingly conflicting lines of decisions on the point and concluded that
the judiciary's special damage requirement had emerged after legislative enactments and,
despite subsequent inconclusive action in the constitution, continued in effect. Id. at 24748, 637 S.E.2d at 388-89. 'Accordingly, the trial court was correct when it dismissed [the
plaintiffs] judicial appeal in light of [his] failure to establish 'special interest-aggrieved
citizen' standing, and the [c]ourt of [aippeals correctly affirmed that decision." Id. at 248,
637 S.E.2d at 389.
323. 281 Ga. 472, 640 S.E.2d 33 (2007).
324. Id. at 472-73, 640 S.E.2d at 34. No one denied the developers' vested rights. Id.
at 473, 640 S.E.2d at 34. "This appeal concerns the question whether vested rights to build
in accordance with prior zoning requirements are transferable." Id. at 472, 640 S.E.2d at
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permits. 32 5 "We conclude," the court announced, "that vested rights to
to the
develop property in accordance with prior zoning are 3personal
26
owner of them and are not transferable with the land."
In EarthResources, LLC v. Morgan County,327 the court reviewed a
county's refusal to verify zoning compliance for the plaintiff's proposed
Under the county's applicable zoning ordinance, the
landfill.328
plaintiff contended, the landfill would constitute a "public utility" as
permitted in areas zoned for agriculture.3 2 9 Rejecting that position,
the supreme court relied upon its prior decision that "'the Public Service
Commission, rather than any other agency of the executive branch, has
authority to regulate public utilities.""'33 That decision alone sufficiently excluded "[the plaintiff's] landfill from the category of public utility,"
likewise withdrawing it from the definition contained in the county
zoning ordinance. 331 Accordingly, the trial court had correctly deter332
and
mined that "a privately-owned landfill is not a public utility,"
333
county.
the
for
the supreme court affirmed summary judgment

III. LEGISLATION
The 2007 General Assembly's lengthy session treated a vast array of
subjects impacting the state's local governments. Merely a hint of

325. Id. at 473-74, 640 S.E.2d at 34-35.
Thus, while vested rights to develop property in accordance with prior zoning
come into being because of the investment of the owner and may thus appropriately be deemed the property of the owner, a nonconforming use develops because of
actions of the governing authority and, not being due to any action of the owner,
becomes part of the character of the property.
Id., 640 S.E.2d at 35.
326. Id. at 474, 640 S.E.2d at 35. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's denial of the
equitable and extraordinary relief sought by the plaintiff builders. See id.
327. 281 Ga. 396, 638 S.E.2d 325 (2006).
328. See id. at 396-97, 638 S.E.2d at 327. The plaintiff needed the county's verification
in order to pursue a state permit to build the landfill. See id. at 396, 638 S.E.2d at 327
(citing O.C.G.A. § 12-8-24(g) (2006)).
329. Id. at 397, 638 S.E.2d at 327. The plaintiff contended that its landfill would be
a public utility because it would be regulated and controlled by the Environmental
Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources. Id.
330. Id. (quoting Lasseter v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 253 Ga. 227,230, 319 S.E.2d 824,
827-28 (1984)).
331. Id. at 397-98, 638 S.E.2d at 327. "That holding alone is sufficient to exclude the
Department of Natural Resources from the role of a state regulatory commission regulating
and controlling public utilities and, therefore, to exclude [the plaintiffs] landfill from the
category of public utility." Id. at 397, 638 S.E.2d at 327.
332. Id. at 397, 638 S.E.2d at 327.
333. Id. at 399, 638 S.E.2d at 329.
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selected measures will confirm the reach and the range of targeted
facets.334
Following a prolonged period of consideration, negotiation, and
frustration, the session finally yielded a replacement for the nonbinding
dispute resolution process regarding municipal annexation.33 5 The
new procedure allots a county thirty days in which to object to a
proposed municipal annexation,3 ' thereby triggering the appointment
of a five-member arbitration panel (experts from outside the county) to
hear the objections.3 7 The panel considers a number of noted factors
and may set conditions on the city's proposed zoning and density.33
Should the city, county, and subject landowner reach agreement during
the process, that agreement stands as the panel's conclusion.339
Otherwise,
the panel's decision may be appealed to the superior
40
3

court.

Yet a second measure going to the heart of the governmental entity
pertains only to counties-and then only counties having no cities within
their boundaries. 341 The statute establishes a procedure via
which
342
such county may be classified as a "consolidated government."
Local government officers and employees found themselves popular
targets of new legislation, several of the statutes affording various
benefits and protections. One of those statutes extended "whistleblower"
protection to city, county, and school board employees-the legislative
authorization to sue their employer for retaliatory treatment
resulting
343
from the employee's reporting of governmental wrongdoing.

334. Information on the measures summarized is drawn from a helpful paper, Final
Legislative Report: 2007 Session of the General Assembly, ASsN COUNTY COMM'RS OF GA.,
June 2007.
335. Ga. H.R. Bill 2, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. §§ 36-36-11
(2206 & Supp. 2007), -110 to -119 (Supp. 2007)).
336. See id. The county may object to such matters as a material change in zoning,
land use, or infrastructure demands. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-36-113(a)).
337. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-36-114).
338. Id. The panel may set conditions on the proposed annexation which will have a
binding effect for one year. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-36-115).
339. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-36-119).
340. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-36-116). The statute provides for the court's
expedited review. Id.
341. Ga. H.R. Bill 109, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 36-68-4
(Supp. 2007)).
342. Id. (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 36-68-4(b)).
343. Ga. H.R. Bill 16, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4
(Supp. 2007)). The statute had previously applied only to state employees. O.C.G.A. § 451-4 (2002) (amended 2007). It authorizes suit if the employee is fired, demoted, suspended,
or not hired. Ga. H.R. Bill 16.
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A second protective measure declares confidential status for the
"personal information" of non-elected local government employees. 3"
Accordingly, such information (for example, social security number,
financial data, insurance, or medical information) is to be redacted from
any records disclosed pursuant to the Open Records Act.345
Finally, local governments obtained statutory authority to establish a
trust fund for post-employment benefits, a measure enabling those
governments to comply with the financial reporting requirements of new
governmental accounting standards.34
County tax commissioners received special legislative attention. One
statute, for example, prohibits the commissioner (and the commissioner's
employee) from buying real property sold at a county public auction.347
A second measure addresses the commissioner's arrangement to receive
That
additional compensation for collecting municipal taxes.348
arrangement may now be accomplished under a single contract between
county and city, with the county receiving the compensation and then
paying it to the tax commissioner.349
Local government elections drew statutory modification in at least two
major respects. First, new legislation came down forcefully on a number
of election offenses, including false registration, election interference,
elector intimidation, unqualified voting, and fraud by poll workers. 50
The statute drastically increased penalties for those offenses-indeed,
changing their classification from misdemeanor to felony.351 A second
measure devoted extensive attention to the tabulation of absentee
ballots-their safekeeping, certification, and validation.3 52 It required
the registrar to publish written notice one week in advance of the

344. Ga. S. Bill 212, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72
(11.3)(A) (Supp. 2007)).
345. Id.; O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to -77 (2006 & Supp. 2007).
346. Ga. S. Bill 156, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 47-20-10(h)
(Supp. 2007)).
347. Ga. H.R. Bill 222, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 48-4-23 (Supp. 2007)).
There is an exception if the commissioner or employee possessed an interest in the
property when the taxes became delinquent. Id.
348. Ga. H.R. Bill 486, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 48-5-359.1
(Supp. 2007)).
349. Id. The statute applies to counties with 50,000 or more tax parcels. Id.
350. Ga. S. Bill 40, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 21-2-384
(Supp. 2007)).
351. Id.
352. Ga. S. Bill 194, § 4, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 21-2-386
(Supp. 2007)).

.328

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

election should
he or she plan to open absentee ballots prior to the close
353
polls.
the
of
The legislative session typically devoted considerable attention to
issues of local government taxation and financial facets. Newly enacted
statutes effected local sales tax exemptions in two socially important
areas. The first exemption covered prepared food and beverages donated
to a nonprofit agency for hunger relief and donations going to assist with
natural disasters.3 54 A second statute crafted a sales tax exemption for
construction materials used in alternative fuel facilities which derive
those fuels from agricultural products and animal fats.
As for financial power grants, local governments received authorization to collect storm-water impact fees upon their approval of development which authorizes site construction.5 6 The measure increased
development interests' representation on the Development Impact Fee
Advisory Committee 35 7 and required detailed records on properties
paying impact fees as well as those receiving exemptions.35 8
A second financial authorization focused upon the local government's
9-1-1 surcharge. 359 The statute enlarged the definition of telephone
service to include all technologies capable of delivering voice communications and accessing a 9-1-1 public safety answering point.360 Fees
collected are remitted directly to the local government, except for prepaid fees which go to the Department of Community Affairs for 9-1-1
improvements in needy areas.3 61
The legislature effected a host of regulatory measures impacting local
governments. Importantly, a reform of the cable franchise law enabled
cable or video providers to apply, through the secretary of state's office,

353. Id.
354. Ga. H.R. Bill 169, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 48-83(57.2)(A) (Supp. 2007)). The statute contains a sunset provision of June 30, 2009. Id.
355. Ga. H.R. Bill 186, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 48-83(34.4)(A) (Supp. 2007)). The statute contains a sunset provision for June 30, 2012. Id.
356. Ga. H.R. Bill 232, §§ 1-2, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. §§ 3671-2, -4 ( 2006 & Supp. 2007)).
357. Ga. H.R. Bill 232, § 3, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 36-71-5
(2006 & Supp. 2007)). An increase from forty percent to fifty percent. Id.
358. Ga. H.R. Bill 232, § 4, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 36-71-8
(2006 & Supp. 2007)). The detailed records required include the property address, the
amount of fees collected, and any reasons for exemptions. Id.
359. Ga. H.R. Bill 394, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2
(2007)).
360. Id.
361. Id. Grant applications for those areas will be approved by the Governor's 9-1-1
Advisory Council. Id.
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for a state franchise to provide cable services statewide.362
The
providers will still pay the five percent franchise fee directly to the local
government,6 3 and customer service will still be locally enforced. 364
New legislation empowered counties and municipalities to require
taxicab owners or operators to obtain a certificate of public necessity in
order to operate inside the local government.3 65 The government may
formulate certificate requirements (allowable under Georgia law) and
issue certificates that are transferable to new taxicab owners or
operators.366
Local governments also suffered regulatory prohibitions; specifically,
on the issue of water connections. 6 7 The subject statute prohibited
counties and municipalities from requiring a water connection-or
charging a water availability fee-of any existing single family residence
or farm which is obtaining its water from a safe private well. 3' The
local government must notify the property owner of the right to opt out
of the connection or availability fee. 36 9 The statute expressly continued
the local government's power to require water connections for new
residences or subdivisions.7 0
Finally, the legislature addressed the instance of a governmental
entity's taking bids on public works projects.37 ' Should it elect to do so,
the measure provides, the entity may accept in lieu of a bid bond for the
project an irrevocable letter of credit up to a threshold of $750,000.372
IV.

CONCLUSION

Oh, for more sine die adjournments in the nocturnal administration of
local government!

362. Ga. H.R. Bill 227, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 36-76-1 to -11 (Supp.
2007)). Providers may continue under existing agreements with local governments or
immediately opt into the state agreement. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-76-4 (Supp. 2007)).
363. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-76-6 (Supp. 2007)).
364. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-76-7 (Supp. 2007)). Until competition exists in at
least fifty percent of the jurisdiction. Id.
365. Ga. H.R. Bill 519, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-60-25 (Supp. 2007)).
366. Id. Upon the new owner or operator meeting all requirements. Id.
367. Ga. H.R. Bill 247, § 2, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-60-17.1 (Supp.
2007)).
368. Id. Unless the well's water is demonstrably unfit for human consumption. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. The statute exempts public water systems serving over 70,000 connections or
averaging more than 200 connections per square mile. Id.
371. Ga. H.R. Bill 134, Reg. Sess. (2007) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 36-91-71
(2006 & Supp. 2007)).
372. Id. This represents an increase from the previous $300,000 threshold, and the
government entity still possesses sole discretion as to accepting a letter of credit. Id.

